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Torts
TORTS-STRIcT

LIABILITY-UNDER PENNSYLVANIA

LAW DAMAGES SOLELY

TO A DEFECTIVE PRODUCT ITSELF ARE RECOVERABLE
UNDER SECTION

402A

Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1981)
In September, 1975, a front-end loader owned and operated by the
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corporation (PGS) was seriously damaged when
a fire broke out in the front portion of the loader.' No one was injured,
and no property was damaged, but as a result of the fire, PGS incurred
expenses of approximately $170,000 in repairing and securing a temporary replacement for the machine. 2 In June, 1979, PGS filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
against the manufacturer of the loader, Caterpillar Tractor Company
(Caterpillar),' seeking to recover the amount spent repairing and replacing the machine. 4 PGS did not claim that a defect caused the fire, but
rather alleged that Caterpillar's failure to either equip the loader with a
fire suppression system or provide adequate warnings of the steps to be
taken in case of a fire, constituted design defects 5 which created an un1. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 496 F. Supp.
712 (M.D. Pa. 1980). PGS used the loader in its daily quarry operations for
approximately four years without any problems. 652 F.2d 1165, 1166 (3d Cir.
1981). There had been no evidence throughout this period that heavy use had
rendered the loader in any way unfit for its intended purpose. Id. When the
fire broke out on September 20, 1975, the machine was in operation and the
operator was forced to abandon the machine. Id. In his haste to evacuate, the
operator neglected to turn off the motor, and consequently, hydraulic fluid continued to fuel the fire. Id. The Third Circuit's decision in Pennsylvania Glass
Sand is discussed in Fallon, Physical Injury and Economic Loss-The Fine Line
of Distinction Made Clearer, 27 VILL. L. REv. 483 (1982).
2. 652 F.2d at 1166. The extent of the damage was largely due to the fact
that the loader did not have a system to extinguish fires. Id. Further, the
operating instructions were silent regarding the steps or precautions that
should be taken in the event a fire occurred in the loader. Id. PGS asserted
that had the loader been equipped with the fire suppression system and ade.
quate warnings, the fire would have been extinguished promptly, and the resulting damage would have been minimal. Id. at 1166-67.
The repairs made by PGS included the installation of automatic fire suppression equipment and the posting of instructions to guide operators in the
event of a fire. Id. at 1166.
3. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 496 F. Supp.
712, 713 (M.D. Pa. 1980). Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). 652 F.2d at 1166.
4. 652 F.2d at 1166.
5. Id. at 1167. For a discussion of the defects, see note 2 and accompanying
text supra. PGS merely alleged that the faulty design increased the quantity
of damage stemming from a fire of purely accidental origin. 652 F.2d at
1167.

(836)
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reasonable risk of harm under section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.0
Asserting that the damages sought by PGS were purely economic in
nature and that economic loss was not recoverable in tort,7 Caterpillar
moved for summary judgment.8 The district court granted the motion,
reasoning that the Pennsylvania courts would hold that economic loss is
only recoverable in a breach of warranty action and therefore, PGS's
claim was barred as a matter of law.9
On appeal, 1° the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit 11 reversed and remanded, holding that the Pennsylvania courts
would classify damage confined solely to the defective product itself as
physical harm to property recoverable under section 402A. Pennsylvania
Glass Sand Corp. v. CaterpillarTractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
A plaintiff in a products liability suit may bring suit under various
legal theories including negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability in tort.'2 The historical development of the contract-warranty
6. 652 F.2d at 1167. PGS also advanced a claim in negligence alleging
faulty design, but did not assert a claim under the Uniform Commercial Code
for breach of warranty. Id.
7. Id. The purely economic damages sought by PGS were repair and replacement costs. Id. Additionally, Caterpillar claimed that its liability was
limited by an express warranty that confined PGS's remedy to replacement of
defective parts, and which specifically excluded recovery for economic loss. Id.
For a discussion of the definition of "economic loss," see .note 23 infra.
8. 652 F.2d at 1167.
9. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 496 F. Supp.
712, 715-16 (M.D. Pa. 1980). Because the district court held as a matter of
law that the damages sought were purely economic, and therefore, no cause of
action in tort existed, it was unnecessary for the district court to consider the
effect of Caterpillar's express warranty. 652 F.2d at 1167. For a discussion of
express and implied warranties, see notes 14 and 15 infra. For a discussion

of the evolving majority view toward recovery of economic loss, see notes 22-28
and accompanying text infra.
10. 652 F.2d at 1167. On appeal, PGS argued that the injury it suffered
was not economic loss but rather physical harm to its property occasioned by
a catastrophic event. Id.
11. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Rosenn, and Hunter. Judge
Adams delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.
12. Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review
of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 583-588 (1980). Prior to the early
1960's, recovery in product liability cases was limited to causes of action under
theories of breach of warranty and negligence. Id. at 583. The warranty
theories are now codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and include liability for breach of an express warranty under U.C.C. § 2-313, breach

of the implied warranty of merchantability under U.C.C. § 2-314, and breach
of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under U.C.C. § 2-315.

See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, -314, -315 (1976). For the text of these U.C.C. provisions,
see note 14 infra. For a discussion of the development of the warranty theory

in products liability, see note 13 infra. For a discussion of the rationale underlying contract law, see note 15 and accompanying text infra.
Common negligence cases include action for breach of the duty to manufacture a product properly; see Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co. of Phila., 190 F.2d
825 (3d Cir. 1951); Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94
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and strict liability theories is extensive and intertwined. 13 The contract(1974); the duty to design a product properly; see Azzarella v. Black Bros.,
Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1928); the duty to inspect; see Kratz v.
American Stores, 359 Pa. 326, 59 A.2d 138 (1948); and the duty to warn; see
Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945).
Today, nearly all states recognize a third theory-strict liability-where
recovery is permitted against a manufacturer or supplier of a product that is
defective and unreasonably dangerous without proof of negligence. Keeton,
supra, at 585. In Pennsylvania, strict liability was adopted in Webb v. Zern,
422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), when the Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. For a discussion of the evolution of the
theory of strict liability, and the text of § 402A, see note 13 infra.
13. Historically, breach of warranty was an action in tort. Prosser, Warianty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 118 (1943). The warranty action was based upon a breach of an assumed duty, and the wrong was
thought to be a form of misrepresentation in the nature of deceit. Id., citing
Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888). After 1750, express
warranties began to be recognized as terms of a contract of sale, yet an action
on an implied warranty remained a tort action. Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Douglas
18 (1778). See Prosser, supra, at 119-20. By 1810, implied warranties of quality
were established. Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391, 170 Eng. Rep. 1194
(1810). In 1815, the fundamental principle of the implied warranty of merchantable quality was established in Gardner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep.
Gardner established that implied in every contract is the buyers'
46 (1815).
right to expect the article to conform to its contractual description. Prosser,
supra, at 119-20. Liability is based on the fact that the parties contracted
for one thing, yet another was delivered and the intention of the parties was
not satisfied. Id. at 120-21.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the idea became accepted that
the warranty should be implied in law and not based upon the representations or the intent of the parties. Id., citing Williston, Representation and
Warranty in Sales, 28 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1913). The warranty implied in law
was based on the practice of sellers assuming responsibility for what they sold
together with the idea that this responsibility could be distributed to the public as part of the purchase price. Prosser, supra, at 122.
Notwithstanding its tort background, modern law regards a warranty
action as contractual in nature. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37
Therefore, a buyer could not bring suit for breach
OR. L. REv. 119, 131 (1958).
of warranty against the remote manufacturer because of lack of privity. Id. at
131-32. This "privity bar" rule was developed in the case of Winterbottom
v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 11 L. J. Ex. 415 (1842). The privity bar rule of
Winterbottom was not only applied to contract actions, but to actions in
tort as well. Gillam, supra, at 133. Thus was created the anomolous rule
that privity cut across both contract and tort; where there is no privity of
contract, there can be no liability in tort or contract. Id. at 138.
The abandonment of the privity rule in tort actions came in MacPherson
In MacPherson,
v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
Judge Cardoza held the plaintiff liable based upon a general duty to use
reasonable care to avoid injury to those to whom injury due to manufacturing
defects are reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053. See also
Gillam, supra, at 141. Specifically the court stated:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of
danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected.
If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing
will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without
new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this
We are now dealing
thing is under a duty to make it carefully ....
with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished product, who
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warranty theories, now governed by the Uniform Commercial Code
puts it on the market to be used without inspection by his customers.
If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow.
217 N.Y. at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053. See also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 793 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Fall].
Support for abolishing the privity bar rule in warranty actions began in
1927 in Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927). See
Prosser, The Fall, supra, at 800. Eventually, a warranty was held to be made
by the remote manufacturer directly to the consumer. Le Blanc v. Louisiana
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952); Worley v. Procter
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); Markovch
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958).
Notwithstanding the demise of the privity bar rule, there remained
conceptual inconsistencies with the warranty cause of action. As Prosser
stated:
The conclusion from all this is obvious. If warranty is a matter of
tort as well as contract, and if it can arise without any intent to make
it as a matter of contract, then it should need no contract; and it
may arise and exist between the parties who have not dealt with
one another. Notwithstanding this ready-to-hand logic, however, the
concept of warranty has involved so many major difficulties and disadvantages that it is very questionable whether it has not become
rather a burden than a boon to the courts in what they are trying to
accomplish.
Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1127 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault]. The
breach of warranty action continues to pose many practice obstacles to plaintiffs. See id. at 1127-34.
Finally, in 1962, came the advent of strict liability in tort in the landmark
case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). The Yuba court stated:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the
theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufac
turer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed
by the agreement but imposed by law . . . and the refusal to permit
the manufacturer to define the scope of his own responsibility for defective products . . . make clear that the liability is not one governed
by the law of contract warranty but by the law of strict liability in
tort.
Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. See also Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 29 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Prosser, The Fall, supra, at
802-04.
The next chapter in the history of strict tort liability came in 1964 with
the adoption of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A by the American
Law Institute. Section 402A provides:
A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
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(U.C.C.), 14 seek to protect the purchaser's expectations and provide dam(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS,

§ 402A (1964).

For a discussion of the promulgation of § 402A, see Titus, Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 713, 713-751 (1970).
Pennsylvania adopted § 402A in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 425, 220 A.2d
853, 854 (1966). Cases construing § 402A in Pennsylvania include Azzerello
v. Black Bros. Co. Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Berkebile v. Brantly
Helicopter, 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975); Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton
Corp., 457 Pa. 432, 419 A.2d 914 (1974); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263,
382 A.2d 206 (1971); Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 258 Pa. Super. Ct. 59, 391
A.2d 1074 (1978); and MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384,
257 A.2d 676 (1969).
14. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, -314, -315 (1976). Breach of an express warranty is
provided for in § 2-313 which states:
Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall
conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he
have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely
of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the
seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-313 (1976).
Breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is provided for in
§ 2-314 which states:
Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under
this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all
units involved; and
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ages for losses resulting from the seller's breach of an express or an
implied warranty. 15
Recovery in tort, on the contrary, is based upon obligations imposed
16
Strict liability, unlike the torts of negligence 17
on persons by law.
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f)conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.

U.C.C. § 2-314 (1976).
Breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is provided for in § 2-315 which states:
Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next
section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.

U.C.C. § 2-315 (1976).
15. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted
by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123, 127
(1974). Dean Wade stated:
Contract (sales) law protects the expectation interests of the parties.
It seeks to give them the benefit of their bargain-to put them in the
position they would have been if the contract had been carried out.
It depends upon the agreement of the parties as to what their essential
undertakings are. Even where the law imposes an obligation on a
party in addition to that which he actually agreed to (as by warranty), it purports to find an "implied" agreement and still approaches
the problem from the standpoint of a consensual arrangement. In
the sale of personal property, contract law is concerned with the
quality of the product, and it sets forth quality standards (merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose).
Id. at 127. See also Ex. rel. Western Seed Prod. v. Campbell, 250 Or. 252, 266,
442 P.2d 215, 217 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); A. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRAcrS, § 1, at 2 (1952); Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product
Economic Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REV. 493 (1978); Note, Products Liability:
Expanding the Property Damage Exception in Pure Economic Loss Cases, 54
Cm.-KENT L. REV. 963, 964 (1978).
The express warranty is part of the contract between the parties and is
enforceable as such. The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
a particular purpose are created by law and imposed in all contracts. Wade,
supra note 13, at 5-6. The typical warranty action is one on the contract for
the economic loss sustained by the purchaser because the product is not what
it was expected, or warranted to be. Id. at 6.
16. Wade, supra note 15, at 127. Professor Prosser stated:
The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of the interests protected. Tort actions are created to protect
the interest in freedom from various kinds of harm. The duties of
conduct which give rise to them are imposed by law, and are based
primarily upon social policy, and not necessarily upon the will or intention of the parties.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971).

17. A negligence cause of action will lie when the manufacturer's product
causes harm while used in a manner and purpose for which it was manufactured where the manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care in manu-
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and misrepresentation,1 8 imposes liability without a finding of fault.1 9
facturing the product, creating a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm.
L. FRUMER AND M.

FRIEDMAN,

PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.03[l], at 25-26 (1981),

citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
Professor Keeton has stated that there are two distinct grounds upon which
a negligence cause of action can be based. Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965). The first is
that although a product is exactly what the manufacturer intends it to be, the
manufacturer was negligent in either selling such a product at all in its condition or in failing to give adequate warning about the dangers involved in its
use or misuse, or give adequate instructions to avoid such dangers. Id. The
second ground for negligence arises in situations in which the claim is that
an error in the manufacturing process occurred and brought about a condition in the product that was not intended, and this condition caused the
product to be defective and unreasonably dangerous. Id. See also W. PRosSER, supra note 16 at 644-45.

18. Liability can also be imposed upon a manufacturer or seller for misrepresentation when the defendant knows, or has reason to know, that his
product is dangerously defective and makes representations to the contrary.
This theory of liability is stated in § 402B of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, which states:

One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising,
labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a
material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by
him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the
chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation,
even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402B (1965).
19. Thus, to establish a case in strict liability, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that he was injured while using the product in a way that it
was intended to be used, as a result of a defect in the design or manufacture,
and that he was not aware of the fact that the product was not safe for its
intended use. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962). The Yuba court stated that the reason
for creating strict liability in tort is to insure that the cost of injuries resulting
from defective product are borne by the maker who placed the product in the
stream of commerce and not by the injured person who is powerless to protect himself. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The court noted
that recovery should not be dependent on the intricacies of sales law, such as
notice. Id. See also Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 95,
337 A.2d 893, 898 (1975). Chief Justice Jones stated that § 402A recognizes
liability without fault, but that § 402A is not without limits. Id. For example, the seller is not responsible for harm caused by inherently dangerous
products such as knives or alcohol products. Id.
Strict liability has in effect made the seller a guarantor of his product's
safety, but it has not made him an insurer against all injuries caused by his
product. Azzerello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 553, 391 A.2d 1020,
1024 (1978). Dean Wade explained this distinction as follows:
What do we mean when we speak of strict liability of a manufacturer
for harm caused by his product? Is it sufficient for a plaintiff to show
that he used the defendant's product and that he was injured? The
answer is no. .

.

. If the theory is strict liability in tort, the plain-

tiff must prove that the article was unsafe in some way. Thus, the
liability is not that of an insurer; it is not absolute in the literal sense
of the word.
Wade, supra note 13, at 13.
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Strict liability protects persons from being exposed to an unreasonable
risk of injuries to person or property due to a defective product and
requires that the social costs of defective products be borne by the
20
manufacturer who placed the product in the stream of commerce.
Due to the different interests that strict liability and warranty law
protect, 2 ' a majority of courts take the position that losses deemed to be
"economic" are not recoverable in strict liability, but are in a warranty
action. 22 Economic loss includes the cost of repair and replacement of
the defective product or the consequential loss of profits where there has
been no claim of personal injury or damage to property other than to
the defective product itself.2 3 The seminal case espousing the majority
view that economic loss is recoverable only in a warranty action is Seely
v. White Motor Co.24 In Seely, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of
20. The rationale for strict liability was succinctly stated by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania:
The realities of our economic society as it exists today forces the conclusion that the risk of loss for injury resulting from defective products should be borne by the suppliers, principally because they are
in a position to absorb the loss by distributing it as a cost of doing
business. In an era of giant corporate structures, utilizing the national media to sell their wares, the original concern for an emerging
manufacturing industry has given way to the view that it is now the
consumer who must be protected. Courts have increasingly adopted
the position that the risk of loss must be placed upon the supplier of
the defective product without regard to fault or privity of contract.
Azzerello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 553, 391 A.2d 1020, 1023-24
(1978). See also Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d
903, 907 (1974); Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Products' Design
and Manufacture, 52 TEx. L. REV. 81 (1973).
21. For a discussion of the interests protected in tort law, see notes 19 8&
20 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the interests protected in
contract law, see note 15 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
the history of warranty and strict liability law, see note 13 supra.
22. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text infra.
23. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d
280, 284 (1980); Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194,
199, 364 N.E.2d 100, 103 (1977), both quoting Note, Economic Loss in Products
Liability Jurisprudence,66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918 (1966).
Other commentators have described economic loss as "the diminution in
the value of the product because it is inferior in quality and does not work
for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold." Note,
Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchasersfor "Economic Loss" DamagesTort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. Rv. 539, 541 (1966), quoted in Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d at 284, n.8;
Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d at 199, 364 N.E.2d
at 103. See also Ribstein, supra note 15; Comment, supra note 15; Comment,
Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic Loss", 13 IDAHO L. REV. 29, 40-41
(1976); Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in
Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L REV.
145, 154-55 (1972).
24. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). Cases from various
jurisdictions which follow Seeley in holding that mere economic loss is not
recoverable in tort include: Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481
F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Texas law); Bright v. Goodyear Tire &
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his truck 25 seeking damages for the repair of the equipment, payments
made toward the purchase price of the truck, and lost profits. 2 6 The
Supreme Court of California held the manufacturer liable on an express
warranty theory and rejected recovery of the economic loss on the basis
of strict liability in tort.2 7 The court reasoned that the loss involved
the failure of the product to perform to the plaintiff's level of expecta28
tion, an injury protected by, and recoverable in contract law.
Rubber Co., 463 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1972) (applying California law); Southwest Forest Ind., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970) (applying Arizona law); Midland
Forge, Inc. v. Letts Ind., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1975) (applying
Iowa law); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962 (D. Ariz.
1975), aff'd 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying law of Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Texas, and Alaska); Noel Transfer & Package Del. Serv., Inc. v.
General Motors Corp., 341 F. Supp. 968 (D. Minn. 1972) (applying strict liability law of Minnesota); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 848 P.2d 279
(Alaska 1976) (applying Alaska strict liability law); Hiigel v. General Motors
Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975) (applying Colorado strict liability
law); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 320, 581 P.2d 784 (1978)
(applying Idaho negligence law); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio
St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965) (applying Ohio negligence law); Nobility
Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977) (applying Texas
strict liability law).
25. 63 Cal. 2d at 12, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The plaintiff had entered into a conditional sales agreement for the purchase of a truck
manufactured by the defendant, White Motor Company. Id. Upon initial
use of the truck, it bounced violently or "galloped." Id. For approximately
one year, the retailer, with aid from White, made many unsuccessful attempts to correct the problem. Id. In July, 1979, the brakes failed, the
truck overturned and was damaged in the amount of $5,466.09. Id. Later,
after paying roughly one-half the purchase price of $22,041.76, the plaintiff
gave notice to the retailer that he would make no more payments. Id. Thereafter, the retailer repossessed the truck and resold it for $13,000.00. Id.
26. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20. The plaintiff
brought the action against both the retailer and White, seeking damages for
repair of the truck and money paid on the purchase price plus lost profits.
Id. at 12-13, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20. At trial, the court dismissed the retailer without prejudice. The trial court awarded the plaintiff
his claim on the purchase price and profits. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45
Cal. Rptr. at 20.
27. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24. The court found
that White had breached its express warranty to the plaintiff and judgment
was affirmed for the plaintiff in the amount of $11,659.44 for the payment on
the purchase price and $9,240.40 for lost profits. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148,
45 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The Court denied the plaintiff's claim based on strict
liability for the cost of repairs, as there was no proof that the defect caused
the physical damage to the truck. Id. at 19, 302 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr.
at 24.
28. The Court noted that the law of sales governs the economic relationship between buyers and sellers, and strict tort liability, rather than undermining the warranty provisions of the U.C.C., governs the area of personal
injury. Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21. The Seely court
stated:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having
an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on
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The leading case espousing the minority view that economic loss is
29
recoverable in a strict liability action is Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian.
In Santor, the plaintiff, through a retailer, purchased a defective and
virtually worthless rug and filed a breach of warranty action.80 The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could maintain his
warranty action directly against the remote manufacturer notwithstanding the absence of privity, 31 and in dicta, stated that a strict liability
3
cause of action was also available to the plaintiff.

2

In cases where the defective product causes damages only to itself,
the jurisdictions that follow Seely require a determination of whether
an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer
must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately
be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring
his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions
that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the
level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's
demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will of the
manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys
a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with
the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations
unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in actions for
negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical
injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss alone.
Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. For a definition of "economic
loss," see note 23 and accompanying text supra.
29. 44 N.J. 52, 64-65, 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (1965).
30. Id. at 56-57, 207 A.2d at 307. After purchasing the rug from a local
retailer, the plaintiff noticed an unusual line in it after it was installed. Id.
at 56, 207 A.2d at 307. After waiting several months for the line to "wear
out" as the dealer had advised, the plaintiff went to the dealer to "have it
out," only to learn that he had moved to Maine. Id. Eventually, the plaintiff contacted the defendant manufacturer, who examined the carpeting and
indicated that the plaintiff would hopefully have no additional trouble in obtaining an adjustment from the dealer. Id. at 56-57, 207 A.2d at 307. The
adjustment was never made and the plaintiff filed a warranty suit alleging the
rug to be defective and seeking recovery of the purchase price and other costs.
Id. at 57, 207 A.2d at 307.
31. Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 310-11.
32. Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 311. The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically
held that the plaintiff could maintain his warranty action directly against the
remote manufacturer, even without privity of contract. Id. at 63, 207 A.2d
at 310-11. The court stated:
.[W]hen the manufacturer presents his goods to the public for sale he
accompanies them with a representation that they are suitable and
safe for the intended use . . . . The obligation of the manufacturer
thus becomes what in justice ought to be-an enterprise liability, and
one that should not depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales.
The purpose of such liability is to ensure that the cost of injuries
or damage, either to the goods sold or to other property, resulting
from defective products, is borne by the makers of the products who
put them into the channel of trade, rather than by the injured or
damaged persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect themselves.
Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311-12 (citation omitted).
Cases following Santor include: Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co.,
465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank
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the damage suffered constitutes mere economic loss which is only reCoverable in a warranty action, or physical harm due to a hazardous or
dangerously defective condition which is recoverable in strict liability
in tort.33 Representative of these cases are Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.3 4 and Russell v. Ford Motor Co. 3 5
In Jones & Laughlin, the plaintiff purchased a roof for a new steel
finishing plant.3 6 The building was extremely large and was located in
an area of harsh weather conditions. 37 The roof began to deteriorate 38
Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 30, 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (1980); Cova v. Harley David-

son Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970); Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975); Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976); City of Lacrosse v.
Schubert, Shroeder & Assoc. Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
33. See Northern Power & Engr. Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d
324 (Alaska 1981); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 562 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Gherna
v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966); Russell v.
Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978); Air Products & Chem., Inc.
v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
Texas, which follows Seely in that it refuses to allow strict liability recovery for economic loss, has rejected the line of cases following Seely that
damage to the product itself, caused by a hazardous defect, is recoverable
under strict liability. Mid-Continent Aircraft v. Curry County Spraying Service,
572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978). In Mid-Continent, the plaintiff, a commercial
buyer, bought a reconditioned spray plane "as is". Id. at 309. After logging
approximately 30 hours of flight time, the plane had to make a forced landing
due to a missing lockplate. Id. at 310. The crash landing resulted in damage to the plane, however, there was no damage to any other property and
the pilot was not injured. Id. The plaintiff alleged counts of negligence,
breach of warranty, and strict liability against the seller. Id. The Supreme
Court of Texas held that in a transaction between a commercial seller and
a commercial buyer, where there is no damage to other property and no personal injury, damage to the defective product itself is an economic loss recoverable only under the U.C.C. Id. at 313. The court reasoned that under

Texas law, mere loss of value resulting from the failure of a product to perform according to expectation is governed by the U.C.C. Id. at 311. The
court noted there was a split of authority regarding whether damage only to
a product due to an unreasonably dangerous defect is recoverable under
strict liability. Id. at 311-12. The court noted Page Keeton's statement that
a " 'damaging event that harms only the product should be treated as irrelevant to policy considerations directing liability placement in tort. Consequently, if a defect causes damage solely to the property, recovery should be
available, if at all, on a contract-warranty theory." Id. at 312, quoting Keeton,

Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1978). The court stated that the legislature had adopted
the U.C.C. as a comprehensive framework of rights and remedies for the transacting parties and that to expand strict liability in the instant case would frustrate the purpose of the Code. 572 S.W.2d at 312-13.
34. 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980).

35. 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978).
36. 626 F.2d at 281.
37. Id. The plaintiff constructed a building with a roof surface size of
1,300,000 square feet and was well aware that the weather conditions included
winds of high velocity and extreme temperature fluctuations. Id. Further,
there was a critical need that the millions of dollars worth of property housed
in the building be protected from the elements. Id. Because of these concerns, the plaintiff hired Johns-Manville to recommend and supply suitable

materials for the roof. Id.
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and the plaintiff sued the manufacturer 39 under various tort theories
including section 402A,40 seeking to recover the cost of repairing and
replacing the roof.4 1 The Third Circuit predicted that the Supreme
Court of Illinois 42 would follow Seely and therefore held that pure
economic loss, as distinguished from physical damage to the product
itself, is not recoverable under section 402A.4 3 Since the plaintiff sought
38. Id. at 282. Shortly after the roof was completed, it began to crack,
wrinkle and blister. Id. Water entered the building through the cracks,
damaging the steel products within and causing electrical outages. Id. Finally,
over a span of three years, massive sections of the roof blew off while the remaining portions continued to deteriorate. Id.
39. Id. The suit was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania, and was later removed to the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Id.
40. Id. The plaintiff based its claim on theories of strict tort liability,
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent performance of services, breach of express and implied warranties and breach of contract. Id.
41. Id. The jury found Johns-Manville liable on four theories: I) strict
liability for defects in the roofing products; 2) strict liability for defects in
the design of the roof; 3) strict tort liability for misrepresentation, and 4)
negligent performance of services. Id. at 283. Jones & Laughlin had claimed
over $1,700,000 for repairs and up to $3,200,000 to repair and replace defective
portions of the roof. Id. It did not seek damages for any injuries that may
have been sustained by its steel products, the electrical equipment, or any other
property within the plant. Id. The jury returned a verdict of $2,000,000. Id.
42. Id. at 283-84.
43. Id. at 285. Because the Illinois Supreme Court had not decided the
issue of whether economic loss is recoverable under tort law, the Third Circuit
decided to follow Illinois appellate court cases. Id., citing Alfred N. Koplin
& Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d, 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977); Rhodes
Phannacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726
(1966). Specifically, the court stated:
§§ 402A and 402B, which establish respectively strict liability for defective products and misrepresentations in the sale of products, apply
only where the product or misrepresentation causes physical harm to
the user of the product. Nowhere in the accompanying commentary
or illustrations do the reporters of the Restatement indicate that the
doctrine of strict liability covers economic losses.
The rationale behind strict liability in personal injury situations is not
well-suited to claims alleging only economic loss. Economic loss results from the failure of the product to perform to the level expected
by the buyer and the seller. Such loss is most frequently measured
by the cost of repairing the infirmity or by the dillerence in the
value of the product as it exists and the value it would have had if
it performed as expected. Thus, economic loss is almost always incurred by the owner of the product, not by the persons who merely
use it or come into contact with it. The original purchaser, particularly, a large company such as Jones & Laughlin, can protect itself
against the risk of unsatisfactory performance by bargaining for a warranty. Alternatively, it may choose to forego warranty protection in
favor of a lower purchase price for the product. Subsequent purchasers may do likewise in bargaining over the price of the product.
In any event, because persons other than the owner of the product
will not incur economic losses resulting from the product's poor performance, the costs associated with economic loss will likely be reflected in the price of the product. There accordingly would seem
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44
damages for only economic harm, the court dismissed the claim.
In Russell, the plaintiff lost control of the truck he was driving due
to an allegedly defective axle. 45 The plaintiff sought recovery solely for
damage to the truck. 46 The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the
47
plaintiff could recover under section 402A for his economic losses.

The court stated that strict liability protects persons from a defective
product that endangers human life or property other than the product
itself.4 s In order to recover under strict liability, the plaintiff must
show that the loss was a consequence of the kind of danger or occurs
under the kind of circumstances, accidental or not, that made the
product dangerous to life or other property.4 9 Thus, the court held that
to be no need to internalize these costs through a non-price mechanism
such as strict liability.
626 F.2d at 288-89 (emphasis added).
44. 626 F.2d at 289-90. The court held that the trial court had erred in
denying the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. and reversed the judgment entered for Jones & Laughlin. Id. at 290.
45. 281 Or. at 589, 575 P.2d at 1384. The plaintiff lost control of the
truck after it went over a bump. Id. The truck left the road, upended, and
finally came to rest on its wheels. Id.
46. Id. The plaintiff's initial complaint alleged negligence, strict liability,
and breach of warranty, however, the case went to trial on an amended complaint averring only strict liability. Id. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff. Id. The defendant manufacturer appealed, contending that the
trial court erred in denying its motion for an involuntary nonsuit and for a
directed verdict based, inter alia, upon the plaintiff's failure to state a cause
of action. Id.
47. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon had to decide "(w)hether
the manufacturer's strict liability for a dangerously defective product may be
invoked when the only injury caused by the defect is to the product itself."
Id. The defendant characterized the loss as merely economic, and thus, recoverable only in contract. Id. The Supreme Court of Oregon agreed with
the trial court's conclusion that strict liability does encompass these damages.
Id. at 589-90, 575 P.2d at 1384.
48. Id. at 594, 575 P.2d at 1386. The court noted that the evolution of
products liability law in Oregon that resulted in the adoption of strict liability
in tort was motivated by a concern for personal injuries. Id. The basis of
strict liability is the marketing of a dangerously defective product. Id. A
dangerously defective product is one that is unreasonably dangerous to a consumer or his property. Id. at 590, 575 P.2d at 1384, citing Brown v. Western
Farmers Assoc., 268 Or. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974).
49. 281 Or. at 595, 575 P.2d at 1387. The court noted that merely because a product is determined to be dangerously defective, the seller is not
liable for all losses that result from its use. Id. The basis of strict liability,
the marketing of a dangerously defective product, also controls the extent of
the seller's liability. Id. (emphasis added). To recover under strict liability,
the alleged loss must be the result of the kind of condition that made the
product dangerously defective, that is, a condition that endangers people
or other property. Id. at 593-94, 575 P.2d at 1386. Thus, the requirement
that the loss sustained flow from a condition in the product that rendered it
dangerously defective is a limit on the sellers liability under § 402A. Id. at
595, 575 P.2d at 1387. Should a buyer sustain economic loss from a dangerously defective product where that defect did not cause the loss, there can be
no recovery under strict liability. Id. As the court summarized it, the distinction is between an endangered buyer and one who is merely disappointed.
Id.
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in the case before it, the defect that fortuitously caused only economic
loss was a life-endangering defect and therefore the loss was recoverable
under section 402A.50
Recently, in Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co.,51 the Supreme Court of Alaska combined the reasoning of
its earlier decisions 52 with that of Russell and developed a clear test to
determine if recovery under strict liability is appropriate when a hazardous product has caused damage only to itself.53 -The court held that
strict liability recovery is appropriate when a defective product that is
50. Id. In the case before it, the proper conditions for recovery were met.
Id. The defect alleged, a defective axle bearing, was a life endangering one.
Id. The damages alleged, although purely economic, were caused by this
defect. Id. It was fortuitous that this defect merely caused damage to the
truck and did not cause any personal injury. Id. Because the damage to the
truck itself was caused by this life endangering defect, the loss was recoverable
under § 402A. Id.
51. 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981). Northern Power purchased a diesel powered electrical generator from Northern Commercial which was designed and
manufactured by Caterpillar. Id. at 325. The engine failed, resulting in
severe damage to the machine but none to persons or other property. Id.
Northern Commercial filed suit against Northern Power, alleging that money
was owed for services rendered to repair the engine. Id. at 326. Northern
Power joined Caterpillar as a third party defendant claiming, inter alia, strict
liability in tort. Id. Caterpillar's motion for summary judgment, contending
that the damage suffered by Northern Power was economic loss and not physical harm, was granted and thus, damages were not recoverable on a strict
tort liability theory. Id. Northern Power based its appeal on the grounds
that the trial court erred in characterizing the injury to the machine as economic
loss. Id.
52. Id. at 327. See Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977);
Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976). In Cloud,
the Supreme Court of Alaska reaffirmed Morrow and clarified the distinction
between property damage and "economic loss" by stating:
We recognize that the line between economic loss and direct property damage is not always easy to discern, particularly when the
plaintiff is seeking compensation for loss of the product itself. We
cannot lay down an all inclusive rule to distinguish between the two
categories; however, we note that sudden and calamitous damage will
almost always result in direct property damage and that deterioration,
internal breakage and depreciation will be considered economic loss.
In their attempts to distinguish between direct property damage and
economic loss, the courts should be guided by the existence of, and
underlying purposes for, the Uniform Commercial Code warranty
actions.
563 P.2d at 251 (footnote omitted).
53. 623 P.2d at 329. The court further noted that the sudden and
calamitous damage test had never been the sole test to determine when there
is property damage. Id. at 328 n.5. Distinguishing between sudden and
calamitous and less dramatic forms of injury, the Cloud court drew the line
between products that merely do "not live up to their economic expectations,
and those which, although they [do] not break down in a manner which
[proves] hazardous to persons or to other property, could foreseeably have
done so." 563 P.2d at 251. For a discussion of products that are not "unreasonably dangerous", see generally Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.,
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potentially dangerous to persons or other property damages itself and
the damage is: 1) caused by the dangerous defect, and 2) occurred under
4
dangerous circumstances.5
Although no Pennsylvania court has specifically addressed the question of whether damage to a defective product itself is recoverable under
section 402A, 55 the issue has been peripherally noted.5 6 In Kassab v.
447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971); Brown v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470,
521 P.2d 537 (1974); Eli Lilly Co. v. Casey, 472 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.
1971). But see Ribstein, supra note 15, at 496-501.
54. 623 P.2d at 329. Specifically, the court stated:
We hold, therefore, that when a defective product creates a situation
potentially dangerous to persons or other property, and loss occurs
as a result of that danger, strict liability in tort is an appropriate
theory of recovery, even though the damage is confined to the product
itself. In order to recover under such a theory plaintiff must show
(1) that the loss was a proximate result of the dangerous defect and
(2) that the loss occurred under the kind of circumstances that made
the product a basis for strict liability.
Id.

In discussing when strict liability recovery is permissible for damage solely
to the defective product, the court noted in regard to the requirement of
"potential" danger to persons or other property that in an earlier case involving personal injury the court had held that there is no requirement that
the product be "unreasonably dangerous." All that was needed was a showing by the plaintiff that the defect was the proximate cause of his injury. Id.
at 329 n.9, citing Butaud v. Suburban Marine 8&Sporting Goods, Inc., 543
P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975). In a personal injury case it is unnecessary for the
plaintiff to bear the added burden of proving an "unreasonably dangerous"
defect, but the requirement of proximate causation assures the seller defendant that its liability will remain within reasonable bounds. 623 P.2d at 329
n.9. In the situation where the defective product only causes damage to itself,
the danger of harm to person or other property upon which liability under
§ 402A is based does not materialize. Id. Therefore, in such a case it is appropriate to require the plaintiff to show that the defect had the potential
to cause harm to persons or other property because § 402A liability is premised
upon the dangerousness of the product. Id.
The requirement that the damage caused by the product to itself be the
result of a dangerous defect ties the seller's liability to its marketing an unsafe product. Id. at 329 n.10. Liability will attach even though the loss
actually sustained was not personal injury or damage to other property. Id.
On the other hand, if the dangerous defect did not cause the loss, the seller
can avoid the strict liability claim. Id., citing Comment, Oregon Adopts the
Degree of Danger Test for Strict Liability-The Implied Warranty Alternative, 58 OR. L. REV. 545, 552 (1980).
The last requirement, that the damage occur under dangerous circumstances, is necessary because to allow recovery solely upon proof that the defect could have endangered a person or other property is too speculative. 623
P.2d at 329 n.11, citing Comment, supra.
Applying this test to the facts before it, the court found that a cause of
action under strict liability would not lie as the damage alleged was the result of
a defective oil pressure shutdown mechanism which caused the engine to run
without sufficient oil. 623 P.2d at 329. No evidence was produced to show
that the defect presented the requisite danger to persons or other property.
Id. Thus, the court concluded that under the test the loss was entirely economic and not recoverable under § 402A. Id. at 330.
55. For the text of

§ 402A, see note 13 supra.
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Central Soya,57 a case arising under the U.C.C.,58 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania noted that the language of section 402A appears broad
enough to cover practically all harm that one may suffer due to a defective product, including economic loss.59
Following Kassab, in MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co.,o the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld recovery under section 402A for damages
to a defective car that damaged only itself where "a malfunction of
machinery in the absence of abnormal use and reasonable secondary
cause is evidence of a defective condition." 61 Similarly, in Cornell
56. See Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968); Cornell
Drilling Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 129, 359 A.2d 822 (1976);
MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
For a discussion of these cases, see notes 57-63 and accompanying text infra.
57. 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
58. Id. at 220-21, 246 A.2d at 849. The plaintiffs purchased defective
cattle feed that severely damaged their breeding herd. Id. The plaintiffs
instituted an action against the remote manufacturer based on an implied
warranty of merchantability. Id. at 222, 246 A.2d at 850. The court held that
lack of privity was no longer a bar to recovery in a warranty action. Id. at
226, 246 A.2d at 852.
59. Id. at 221 n.7, 246 A.2d at 854-55 n.7. The court stated that there
no longer exists a requirement of privity in suits under the U.C.C. for breach
of an implied warranty of merchantability because the U.C.C. and § 402A
must be coextensive in products liability cases. Id. at 221, 246 A.2d at 854-55.
On the issue of what damages are compensable under § 402A the court
stated that "the language of the Restatement, speaking as it does of injury to
either the individual or his property, appears broad enough to cover practically all of the harm that could befall one due to a defective product." Id.
at 221 n.7, 246 A.2d at 854-55 n.7. The court then gave an example of a
gas range that exploded, causing serious damage to the kitchen and the range
itself. Id. The replacement of the stove would be "economic loss" and
would be compensable. Id. Thus, the court concluded:
There would seem to be no reason for excluding this measure of
damages in an action brought under the Restatement, since the defective product itself is as much "property" as any other possession
of the plaintiff that is damaged as a result of the manufacturing flaw.
Thus, since the tort action would enable plaintiff to recover the
economic loss . . . so also should this form of damages be compensable in contract.

Id.
60. 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
61. Id. at 392, 257 A.2d at 680. In MacDougall, the plaintiff purchased
a Ford Comet in 1962. Id. at 385, 257 A.2d at 677. In April, 1969, after
only 143 miles of driving, the car went out of control when it attained the
speed of 60 m.p.h. Id. at 385-86, 257 A.2d at 677. Mrs. MacDougall, the
driver, had difficulty steering, lost control, and the car rolled over. Id. The
plaintiff's expert determined that the loss of steering was caused by three
mechanical defects. Id. at 386, 257 A.2d at 678. The plaintiffs brought an
action under § 402A against the dealer and Ford to recover property damage
to the car. Id. at 385, 257 A.2d at 677.
Ford Motor Company appealed a judgment entered upon a verdict for
the plaintiffs, contending that the trial court erred in denying its motion for
judgment n.o.v. Id. Ford contended that the plaintiffs had not met their
burden of proof in that their expert failed to unequivocally state that the
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Drilling Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,6 section 402A recovery was permitted
where a defective truck caused damage only to itself and the plaintiff
proved by circumstantial evidence and inferences that the truck was in a
63
defective condition at the time it left Ford's control.
Against this background, Judge Adams began his analysis in PGS
by noting that the court's task was simply to predict how a Pennsylvania
court would decide the issue of whether damage to a product caused by
a design defect constitutes "economic loss," recoverable under contract
64
law, or "physical property damage" recoverable under section 402A.
In order to make such a determination, Judge Adams stated that it was
necessary to first "examine the interrelationship and the policy differences of tort principles and warranty law, as applied to defective
products." 65

In his analysis, Judge Adams noted that the underlying policy in
product liability tort cases is that a person and/or his property should
not be exposed to unreasonably hazardous conditions. 66 Because of this
policy, most courts hold that pure economic loss, defined as the reduced
value of the product due to its inferior quality or its unsuitability for
defects he found in the steering assembly were the cause of the accident. Id.
at 387, 257 A.2d at 678.
The superior court affirmed, holding that the occurrence of a malfunction
of machinery in the absence of abnormal use and other reasonable causes is
evidence of a defective condition under §402A. Id. at 391, 257 A.2d at 680.
The court did not discuss the issue of whether §402A relief was appropriate
when the only recovery sought was for property damage to the defective car
itself.
62. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 129, 359 A.2d 822 (1976).
63. Id. at 142, 359 A.2d at 828.
new Ford truck in 1968.

In Cornell, the plaintiff purchased a

Id. at 132, 359 A.2d at 823.

Seventeen days after

the purchase, the truck caught fire and the interior, engine and other parts
were damaged. Id. The plaintiff filed a complaint in trespass based on § 402A.
Id. It was alleged that the fire was the result of a defective condition present
at the time the truck was sold and the negligence of Ford's employees. Id.
The trial court held that the plaintiff's evidence was deficient and nonsuited
the plaintiff at the close of his case. Id. at 131-32, 359 A.2d at 823. The
superior court reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit an inference that the truck
was in a defective condition when it left Ford's possession. Id. at 132, 142,
359 A.2d at 923, 928. Again, the court failed to specifically address the
propriety of §402A relief in a case where only the defective product itself
was damaged.
64. 652 F.2d at 1167. Judge Adams also noted that the only pronouncement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the question was in dicta in
Kassab. Id., citing Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
For a discussion of Kassab, see notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
65. 652 F.2d at 1169.
66. Id. The court stated that the obligations of tort law are imposed by
law rather than by bargain, and the main policy of § 402A is to impose upon
the manufacturer the duty to "warrant" the safety of his product. Id. For
a discussion of the policies underlying the law of tort, see notes 19 & 20 and
accompanying text supra.
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the purpose for which it was manufactured,67 is not recoverable in tort.6 8
He then explained that this economic loss falls within the purview of
contract-warranty law which protects the buyers' expectations of suitability and quality.6 9
Judge Adams further stated that in cases where only the defective
product itself is damaged, the majority approach is to identify whether
7°
the damage should be classified as economic loss or physical damage.
In making this classification, the court stated that it is necessary to
analyze "interrelated factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of
risk, and the manner in which the injury arose." 71
Judge Adams next focused on Pennsylvania case law in an effort to
predict how the Pennsylvania courts would decide the issue.72 He
reasoned that the dicta in Kassab v. Central Soya 73 indicates that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that hazardous products which
cause damage to themselves are encompassed within the policy of tort
law, just as are defective products which injure persons or damage other
property.7 "

Judge Adams also found that recent lower court decisions

in Pennsylvania and federal decisions applying Pennsylvania law had
67. 652 F.2d at 1169. This definition of economic loss was set forth in
Note, supra note 23, at 541. For other definitions of "economic loss," see
note 23 and accompanying text supra.
68. 652 F.2d at 1169. For a discussion of the cases holding that pure
economic loss is not recoverable in tort, see notes 24-28 and accompanying
text supra.

69. 652 F.2d at 1169. The items most frequently sought are the reduction

in value caused by the defect, loss of profits, and costs of repair and replacement. See Note, supra note 23, at 918. For a discussion of the policy underlying contract-warranty law, see note 15 and accompanying text supra.
70. 652 F.2d at 1173.
71. Id. The court stated that these interrelated factors "bear directly on
whether the safety-insurance policy of tort law or the expectation bargain
protection policy of warranty law is most applicable to a particular claim." Id.
72. Id.
73. For a discussion of Kassab, see notes 57-59 and accompanying text
supra.
74. 652 F.2d at 1173. This position is buttressed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's discussion of the scope of § 402A in Kassab in which an
exploding gas range was used as an example of economic loss recoverable in
tort. Id. at 1173 n.23, citing Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. at 231 n.7,
246 A.2d at 854-55 n.7. See note 59 supra. Further, individual members of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have indicated in other decisions that the
proper dividing line between warranty law and strict liability is dependent
upon the presence of a safety hazard that presents a danger to persons or
property. See, e.g., Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 412-13, 221 A.2d 320, 325
(1966) (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Webb v. Zern,
422 Pa. 424, 429, 220 A.2d 853, 855 (1966) (Eagen, J., concurring).
Judge Adams noted that this conclusion regarding Pennsylvania law was
consistent with the reasoning in Seely and with the different policies underlying contract and tort law. 652 F.2d at 1173. For a discussion of Seely, see
notes 24-28 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the policies
underlying contract and tort law, see notes 15, 19 & 20 and accompanying
text supra.
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impliedly distinguished between claims for economic loss and for physi75
cal damage to a defective product.
In deciding whether the claim presented in PGS was economic loss
recoverable in warranty or physical harm recoverable in strict liability,
Judge Adams concentrated on the nature of the defect, the type of risk
it posed, and the manner in which the injury arose.70 He reasoned that
the lack of a fire suppression system in the loader, combined with the
absence of adequate warnings, constituted a safety hazard that presented
a serious risk of harm to both persons and property, that is, a defect
which falls within the policy concerns of tort law. 77 Judge Adams noted
that a contract cause of action would not be proper since there was no
allegation that the loader was of poor quality or unfit to perform the
job for which it was purchased.78 Consequently, he held that the
Pennsylvania courts would treat the damage as a type of physical injury
to property compensible under tort law. 79 He concluded further that
the Pennsylvania courts would reach the same decision regardless of
whether the plaintiff was an ordinary consumer or a commercial
consumer.8 0

75.
76.
77.
provide

652 F.2d at 1173.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1175. The court also noted that the duty of the manufacturer to
a safe product encompasses the obligation to install safety devices on

a product of this type to minimize the risk of injuries. Id., citing Huddell v.

Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) (involving a discussion of New Jersey

strict product liability law and a manufacturer's duty to install safety devices).
78. 652 F.2d at 1175.

Interestingly, PGS asserted that the loader had op-

erated without incident up until the time of the accident. Id. PGS was not
seeking to protect its expectation interest in the loader or to secure the benefit of its bargain; however, it was seeking to be redressed for the damages
caused by a defect in the hazardous loader. Id. The court noted that the
law does not require a purchaser to bargain for a safe product since "the
manufacturer has a legally imposed duty to provide such an item." Id.
79. Id.

80. Id. The court then addressed two less critical issues presented by
Caterpillar. Id. at 1175-76. First, Caterpillar argued that to permit tort recovery in the present situation, where two commercial entities had dealt with
one another at arm's length, would undermine the U.C.C. Id. at 1175. The
court rejected this contention by stating that the suggestion that the remedies
available to a commercial purchaser of a hazardous product are limited to
those provided for in the U.C.C. is at odds with the policies underlying
contract and tort law. Id. Additionally, the court noted that Pennsylvania
law has disapproved of technical or rigid distinctions between contract and
tort actions. Id. See, e.g., Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095
(3d Cir. 1980); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
Thus, the court rejected the rule of Mid-Continent that the U.C.C. controls
cases between commercial entities. 652 F.2d at 1175. For a discussion of
Mid-Continent, see note 33 supra.
Second, Caterpillar argued that the warranty it provided to the plaintiff

defined the exclusive remedies available and fully precluded any tort liability.
652 F.2d at 1175. In two prior decisions, the Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania law permits parties to contractually disclaim § 402A liability if that
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It is submitted that the Third Circuit utilized a logical and analytically sound approach in deciding the issues in PGS.1 The court
concisely traced the development of strict liability and correctly opined
that the underlying policies of contract and tort law are divergent, and
thus, different claims are required under different factual circumstances. 8 2
While contract law protects the expectations of the parties to a bargain,
tort law protects the purchaser from unreasonably dangerous defective
products.83 It is contended that by acknowledging the existence and
the import of this distinction, it was analytically consistent for the court
to predict that Pennsylvania would follow the rule first enunciated
8
in Seely. 4
The court's analysis and holding regarding whether a tort action
will lie for damage sustained only by the defective product itself is con5
sistent with the different interests protected by tort and contract law.8
By focusing on the interrelated factors of the nature of the defect, the
risk that the defect poses, and the manner in which the injury occurred,8 6
the court has adopted a test that, while flexible, draws the fine line between damages compensable in tort or in contract. These three interrelated factors will enable a court to readily determine when a given
defect has the potential to cause harm to persons or other property due
to its hazardous nature.87 In the instant case, no other property was
damaged or people injured, yet recovery in tort was allowed because
is expressly stated in the contract. Id. at 1175-76. For cases dealing with
a disclaimer of § 402A liability under Pennsylvania law, see Posttape Assoc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976); Keystone Aeronautics
Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974). In the present
case, there was insufficient development in the record before the court to ascertain whether the warranty was as Caterpillar alleged. 652 F.2d at 1176.
The task of clarifying the warranty was left to the trial court on remand. Id.
81. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
82. For a discussion of the development of strict liability and warranty
law, see note 13 supra. For a discussion of the underlying policies of contract and tort law, see notes 15, 19 & 20 supra.
83. For a discussion of the underlying policy of contract law, see note 15
supra.
84. For a discussion of the Seely rule, see notes 24-28 and accompanying
text supra.
85. For a discussion of the interests protected in contract-warranty and tort
law, see notes 15, 19 8c 20 supra.
86. 652 F.2d at 1173.
accompanying text supra.

For a discussion of these factors, see note 71 and

87. The clearest example of the ability of this test to perform this
function is the PGS case itself. The defects alleged were the failure to equip
the loader with a fire suppression system or provide adequate warnings of
steps to be taken if a fire occurred. 652 F.2d at 1166. These defects clearly
had the potential to cause serious harm to other property or people if a fire
broke out on the loader. Id. It was merely fortuitous that only the loader
itself was damaged. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss3/13

20

Editors: Torts
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27: p. 836

the potential for such harm was present.88 Thus, the PGS test focused on
the potential for harm that the defective product presented to persons
89
or property and not on the nature of the damages actually incurred.
The PGS test, while not as concise as the test articulated in Northern
Power, does consider the same elements.9 0 The Northern Power test is
laudable in that it too permits tort recovery where the defect creates a
potentially dangerous situation. 91 Yet this seemingly unlimited liability
is carefully circumscribed by the requirements that the loss suffered be
proximately caused by the defect and that the loss occur in circumstances
dangerous to people or other property.0 2 It is submitted that the PGS
court should have done as the Northern Power court did and clearly
require that the harm be proximately caused by the dangerous defect
and, rather than merely considering as a factor the manner in which
the injury arose, require that the injury have occurred in circumstances
dangerous to people or other property.
In considering the import of PGS, it is suggested that until the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically addresses the issues raised, the
decision will have a profound impact on products liability law in Pennsylvania. 93 It would seem that plaintiffs who seek to recover damages
limited to the product itself, given the proper set of circumstances, will
no longer hesitate to bring an action in strict liability, where they once
88. Id. at 1174-75. As the court stated:
"Here, the damage to the front-end loader was the result of a firea sudden and highly dangerous occurrence. Moreover, the alleged
defect-a faulty design that failed to contain the fire and led to
greatly enhanced damage-constitutes a safety hazard that posed a
serious risk of harm to people and property. Thus, the complaint
brought by PGS appears to fall within the policy of tort law that the
manufacturer should bear the risk of hazardous products."
Id. (citations omitted). For a discussion of the rationale for making the
manufacturer bear the costs of these risks, see note 19 supra.
89. 652 F.2d at 1174-75.
90. 623 P.2d at 329. The Northern Power test permits strict tort recovery when a defective product creates a potentially dangerous situation to
other property or persons. Id. The Northern Power test requires the loss
sustained to be the result of a dangerous defect in the product and to have
occurred in dangerous circumstances. Id. For a more extensive discussion of
the Northern Power test, see note 54 and accompanying text supra.
91. 623 P.2d at 329. For a discussion of why potential harm to persons or
other property is sufficient to bring a claim within § 402A under the Northern
Power test, see note 54 supra.
92. 623 P.2d at 324. For a full discussion of these requirements circumscribing liability under the Northern Power test, see note 54 supra.
93. See, e.g., Industrial Uniform Rental Co., Inc. v. International Harvester Co., The Legal Intelligencer, September 16, 1981, at 1, col. 1 (Common
Pleas Court of Philadelphia County, Sept. 4, 1981). The court, in discussing
the issue of whether a plaintiff seeking damages of cost and repair as a result
of cracks and failure in a truck's frame may sue in trespass, relied, inter alia
on the reasoning of PGS. Id. at 31.
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may have felt they were relegated to the more restricted warranty actions
under the Uniform Commercial Code.9 4 It is further suggested that the
three factor approach in PGS, although not as concise as that in Northern
Power, will enable courts to properly draw the fine line between actions
compensable in contract-warranty or in tort law.
The impact of PGS on commercial buyers and sellers will not be
significant. When a buyer and seller are of equal bargaining power,
they can decide which party will bear the risk of loss from a hazardous
defect. 95 Commercial entities may still expressly relieve themselves of
strict tort liability under Pennsylvania law when dealing with other
commercial entities.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the Third Circuit has extended
the doctrine of strict liability under section 402A to cases where the
defective product alone is damaged, regardless of whether the purchaser
is a commercial buyer or an ordinary consumer. 96 Thus, a plaintiff can
now assert a claim in tort and avoid the practical pitfalls of notice,
modification, and limitations of damages that are associated with a
97
warranty action.
Thomas C. Rogers
94. A plaintiff bringing a warranty action under the U.C.C. must contend
with, inter alia: the notice requirement of § 2-606; the exclusion or modification of warranties permitted in § 2-316; and the contractual modification or
limitation of remedies in § 2-719. For a discussion of the problems inherent
in bringing a warranty action, see Prosser, The Assault, note 13 supra, at
1127-34.
95. See Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146,
149 (3d Cir. 1974) (Pennsylvania law permits a freely negotiated and clearly
expressed waiver of § 402A liability between business entities of relatively
equal bargaining strength).
96. 652 F.2d at 1175.
97. For a discussion of these warranty action limitations, see note 94
supra.
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TORTS-MILITARY

SERVICE IMMUNITY-THERE

Is No CAUSE OF ACTION

IMPLIED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
FOR INTENTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL

TORTS OCCURRING

INCIDENT TO MILITARY SERVICE.

Jaffee v. United States (1981) In 1953, while on active duty in the United States Army, Stanley
Jaffee and other soldiers at Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, were ordered by
their commanding officers to stand, unprotected, in an open field near
the site of an explosion of a nuclear bomb.' Jaffee developed inoperable
cancer in 1977 2 and he and his wife brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey against the United States
and various army and civilian government officers3 to recover damages
for alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. 4 The Jaffees alleged
that the individual defendants, knowing of the risks of injury and death
from exposure to massive doses of radiation, intentionally compelled

* EDITOR'S NOTE: As this Note went to print, the principal case under discussion had not yet been submitted for publication in the West Reporter
System. The current official citation is Jaffee v. United States, No. 79-1543
(3d Cir. November 2, 1981) (en banc) [hereinafter cited as Jaffee II].
1. Jafee II, supra note * , at 5. For a prior appeal of this case, see Jaffee
v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Jaffee 1]. The facts are stated as alleged by Jaffee in his complaint and were accepted as true by the Third Circuit for purposes of the
appeal. Jaffee 1I, supra note *, at 5.
2. Jaffee II, supra note 0, at 5.
3. The Jaffees sued past and present officers of the Department of Army,
Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission as individual
defendants. Jaffee v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D.N.J. 1979).
4. Jayfee II, supra note 0, at 5-6. Jaffee alleged violations of his first,
fourth, fifth, eighth, and ninth amendment rights. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend.
I, IV, V, VIII 8 IX. There was no discussion in the court opinions as to how
these constitutional amendments specifically formed the basis of the complaint.
Jaffee also alleged violations of unspecified state tort laws. Jaffee I1, supra
note *, at 5-6. In Counts I-II of the complaint, Jaffee sought compensatory
and punitive damages of $13,000,000 from the United States Government and
the individual defendants. Id. at 6. He alleged that as a result of the exposure to radiation, he developed inoperable lymphatic cancer and was permanently injured, that his life was materially shortened, and that he continued
to suffer substantial pain, disability, emotional and mental anguish, and loss
of the enjoyment of life's pleasures. Id. at 44-45 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
He also alleged that he incurred, and would incur in the future, medical and
other expenses. Id. at 45 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Mrs. Jaffee alleged that
she was, and would continue to be, deprived of her husband's services, society,
consortium and companionship, and was and would continue to be liable for
his medical expenses. Id.
(858)
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Jaffee and the other soldiers to participate in the atomic testing without
their knowledge or consent. 5 Included in Jaffee's complaint was a class
action against the United States on behalf of all the soldiers present at
the explosion, praying that the United States be required to warn all
members of the class about the medical risks facing them and that
medical care be provdied or subsidized for members of the class injured
as a result of that exposure. 6 The class action was dismissed by the
district court on the basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.7 On
interlocutory appeal, the dismissal of the class action was affirmed as to
the medical compensation issue but reversed as to the warning injunction.8 The district court subsequently dismissed the constitutional claim
9
for damages, relying upon Feres v. United States.
5. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 5; Jaffee 1, 592 F.2d 712, 714 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
6. Jaffee II, supra note 0,at 5-6. Count IV of the complaint was a class
action for injunctive relief brought in favor of all the soldiers present at the
Camp Desert Rock site. Id.
7. Id. at 6. For a discussion of the sovereign immunity doctrine, see note
11 and accompanying text infra. The district court retained jurisdicition over
Counts I, II and III, while certifying the dismissal of Count IV for appeal
under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jaffee 1, 592 F.2d
712, 714 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979). See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
8. Jaffee II, supra note *,at 6. See Jaffee 1, 592 F.2d 712, 720 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979). The Third Circuit reasoned that the United
States could be sued only if Congress had waived its sovereign immunity by
statute and that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, constituted
such waiver with respect to certain suits "'seeking relief other than money
damages,' " 592 F.2d at 718, quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides in relevant
part:
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than
money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or
employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under
color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be
denied on the ground that it is against the United States.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). The Government's failure, in the years since the 1953
nuclear testing, to give medical warning to the soldiers present at Camp Desert
Rock was the "agency action" reviewable under § 702 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 592 F.2d at 719. Thus, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Jaffee's claim seeking a warning and remanded the
case. Id. at 720. The claim for medical care was deemed to be an action for
money damages and, therefore, not covered by the APA waiver of sovereign
immunity. Id. at 719. Therefore, the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the claim for medical care. Id. at 720.
For a discussion of Jaffee I, see generally Comment, Constitutional Tort
Remedies: A Proposed Amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 12 CONN. L.
REv. 492 (1980); Comment, Sovereign Immunity-Armed Forces-Nuclear Liability-Jaffee v. United States, 25 N.Y.L.S.L. REv. 377 (1979).
9. See Jaffee v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 632, 633-35 (D.N.J. 1979). For
a discussion of the Feres doctrine of intramilitary immunity, see notes 35-44
and accompanying text infra. The district court concluded: 'To the extent
that Feres is predicated upon the need for maintaining military discipline and
avoiding judicial review of military orders, that consideration apparently
applies with equal force to the negligence, intentional torts and unconstitutional
actions of military officers." 468 F. Supp. at 634-35.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit 10 affirmed, holding that there was no cause of action directly
under the United States Constitution against government officials for
intentional constitutional torts occurring incident to military service.
Jaflee v. United States, No. 79-1543 (3d Cir. November 2, 1981).
The protection against suit traditionally accorded the United States
government under the doctrine of sovereign immunity 1" was waived in

part by Congress with the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act of
1946 (FTCA).12 The FTCA originally provided that the federal district
10. The case was first argued on November 15, 1979, before Judge Gibbons, Higginbotham and Sloviter, and an opinion was filed on February 20,
1980. JaIjee 1H, supra note *,at 2, 7. That decision was later vacated and
the case was heard before the court en banc on November 17, 1980, before
Chief Judge Seitz, and Judges Aldisert, Adams, Gibbons, Rosenn, Hunter,
Weis, Garth, Higginbotham and Sloviter. Jaflee 11, supra note *,at 2, 7.
Judge Higginbotham wrote the opinion of the court. Judge Hunter concurred joined by Judge Aldisert. Judge Adams concurred in part and dissented in part. Judge Gibbons dissented, joined by Judge Sloviter.
11. See Olson, Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability Two Decades
of Decline: 1959-1979, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 485 (1979). The doctrine of sovereign
immunity originated in England and barred suits against the sovereign or state
without its consent. Id. at 486. Although its precise sources are uncertain,
it has been argued that the doctrine evolved from the ancient English maxim
"the king can do no wrong". Id. at 485. Sometime in the early 19th century,
the doctrine was embraced by the judiciary in the United States. Id. at 486.
"[U]nless sovereign immunity has been waived, it bars equitable as well as
legal remedies against the United States." Jaffee 1, 592 F.2d 712, 717 n.10
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979), citing Malone v. Bowdoin, 369
U.S. 643 (1962). The doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability
until congressional modification held "that a unit for government is not liable
for the negligent acts or omissions of its officers, agents, or employees while
engaged in the performance of a governmental function." Olson, supra, at
486. See generally Jaffee, Suits Against Government and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1960).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976). Section 1346(b), which confers
jurisdiction on Federal courts over certain negligence claims against the government, provides:
JT]he district courts, together with the United States District Court
or the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jursdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on or
after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Id. § 1346 (b) (1976). Section 2671 provides that:
As used in this chapter . . . the term "Federal agency" includes the
executive departments, the military departments, independent establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as,
instrumentalities or agencies of the United States but does not include
any contractor with the United States.
"Employee of the government" includes officers or employees of any
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courts "would have exclusive jurisdiction of claims against the United
States for injuries negligently caused by government employees acting
within the scope of their employment under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable under the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred." 13 The purpose of the
FTCA was to transfer from Congress to the courts the duty of determining relief sought by private bills for tortious injuries caused by
government employees. 14 The FTCA was amended in 1974 to permit
suits against the United States for intentional torts, but only "with
regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers
of the United States Government." 5
Government liability was extended to cover torts based on constitional violations by federal officers independent of the FTCA in 1971
in the landmark case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.16 In Bivens, the plaintiff brought suit
against federal agents to recover damages, alleging that the agents
federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United
States, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official
capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United
States, whether with or without compensation.
"Acting within the scope of his office or employment", in the case
of a member of the military or naval forces of the United States, means
acting in the line of duty.
Id. § 2671 (1976).
13. Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 146, 155-56 (1977) (emphasis added). Accord,
United States v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., 612 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980).
Section 2674 of the FTCA provides that "[t]he United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall
not be liable for interest prior to ju'dgment or for punitive damages." 28
U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
14. See Jaflee 1, 592 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir. 1979); Downs v. United States,
522 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1975).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) (1976). As amended, the FTCA provides:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
not apply to (h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, that, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law
enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions
of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any
claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso,
out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process
or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United
States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence,
or to make arrests for violations of federal law.
Id. See generally Boger, Gitenstein 9c Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims
Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C.L. REV.
497 (1976).
16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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violated his fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures by breaking into his apartment and arresting him for alleged
narcotics violations.' 7 The United States Supreme Court held that a
federal cause of action for damages arose due to the fourth amendment
violation by federal agents acting under color of federal authority.'5
The Court concluded that "'where federally protected rights have been
invaded . .

.

. [the] courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as

to grant the necessary relief.' " 19
Following Bivens, the Supreme Court in Davis v. Passman 20 held
that a cause of action and a damages remedy could be implied directly
under the Constitution when the due process clause of the fifth amendment was violated. 21 More recently, the Court held in Carlson v.
Green 22 that a Bivens remedy 23 was available even though the plaintiff's
17. Id. at 389-90. Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents, acting under claim
of federal authority, entered the plaintiff's apartment and arrested him for

alleged narcotics violations, manacled him, and threatened to arrest the entire
family. Id. at 389. Agents searched the apartment, and then took the plaintiff
to the federal courthouse, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected
to a visual strip search. Id. The district court dismissed the complaint on
the ground, inter alia, that it failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 390. The
Second Circuit affirmed on that basis, but the Supreme Court reversed. Id.
18. Id. at 389. The Court stated that the "question is merely whether
petitioner, if he can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation by
federal agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury
through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal
courts." Id. at 397.
The phrase "color of authority" is defined as "[t]hat semblance or presumption of authority sustaining the acts of a public officer which is derived from
his apparent title to the office or from a writ or other process in his hands apparently valid and regular." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 241 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
19. 403 U.S. at 392, quoting Bell , .Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (footnote omitted).
20. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). The petitioner brought suit in district court, seeking damages, alleging that the respondent, a United States Congressman at the

time the case commenced, had discriminated against her on the basis of sex, in
violation of the fifth amendment, by terminating her employment as a deputy
administrative assistant. Id. at 230-31.
21. Id. at 230. The Court first reasoned that the equal protection aspect of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment gave the petitioner a federal
constitutional right to be free from gender-based discrimination. Id. at 234-35.
The Court then discussed "cause of action" in terms of whether the petitioner
was a member of a class of litigants that could legally invoke the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 238-39. Since petitioner based her claim on a fifth amendment
violation which necessitated judicial relief, the Court stated that she had a constitutional cause of action. Id. at 243-44. Finally, the Court concluded that
damages were the appropriate remedy since they were ascertainable and since
no other forms of relief were available. Id. at 245.
22. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). In Carlson, the mother of a deceased federal
prisoner brought suit against the federal prison officials seeking compensatory
and punitive damages, alleging that they violated her son's eighth amendment

right against cruel and unusual punishment by failing to give him proper medical attention for his injuries sustained in prison. Id. at 16.
23. The Carlson Court interpreted Bivens to mean that "victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against
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allegations could also support a suit against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. 24 The Court in Carlson reasoned that a Bivens
remedy would be more effective than an FTCA remedy and that Con2"
gress did not intend to limit a plaintiff to the statutory tort action. a
The Court noted, however, that Bivens established two exceptions to its
creation of a constitutional cause of action for damages: 1) "when defendants demonstrate 'special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress' ",26 and 2) "when defendants
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed as equally effective." 27 In Carlson, neither
of the two exceptions was held to apply because the defendants enjoyed
no specially protected status and there was no evidence of congressional
28
intent to preempt a Bivens-type remedy by the passage of the FTCA.
The Bivens remedy of damages for unconstitutional action has not
been granted in all cases against federal employees, as illustrated by
Butz v. Economou.2 9 In Butz, the Supreme Court held that certain
the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a
right." Id. at 18.
24. Id. at 18-23.
25. The Court found four factors supporting this proposition. Id. at 21-23.
First, the Court stated that the Bivens damages remedy against individuals
would be more of a deterrent to official misconduct than the FTCA remedy
against the Government. Id. Second, the Court noted that punitive damages were statutorily precluded under the FTCA, while they could be awarded
in a Bivens suit. Id. at 21-22. Third, the Court noted that a plaintiff could
not have a jury trial in an FTCA suit as he could in a Bivens suit. Id. at 22,
citing 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976). Last, the Court stated that an action under
the FTCA would exist only if the State in which the tort occurred permitted a
cause of action for that tort, while federal liability for constitutional violations
would be uniformly enforced. 446 U.S. at 23. Thus, the Court concluded that
the "FTCA is not a sufficient protector of the citizens' constitutional rights, and
without a clear congressional mandate we cannot hold that Congress relegated
respondent exclusively to the FTCA remedy." Id.
26. 446 U.S. at 18, quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396.
27. 446 U.S. at 18-19. In Bivens, the Supreme Court indicated that the
second exception to federal liability for constitutional violations was where
there was an "explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally
effective in the view-of Congress." 403 U.S. at 397.
28. 446 U.S. at 19. For a further discussion of Bivens and constitutional
torts, see generally Lehmann, Bivens and Its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4
HASTINGs L.Q. 531 (1977); Note, Remedies for Constitutional Torts: "Special
Factors Counselling Hesitation", 9 IND. L. REV. 441 (1976).
29. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). After an unsuccessful Department of Agriculture
proceeding to revoke or suspend registration of his commodity futures commission company, the plaintiff brought suit for damages in federal district court
against the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, the Judicial Officer,
the Chief Hearing Examiner who had recommended sustaining the administrative complaint, and the Department attorney who had prosecuted the enforceinent proceedings, alleging, inter alia, that by instituting the proceedings
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30
federal agency heads were entitled to a qualified immunity from suit,
while other agency officials, exercising adjudicative or prosecutorial
functions, enjoyed absolute immunity.3 1 In justifying its limited grant
of immunity for government officials the Court noted "the injustice" of
penalizing an exercise of discretion required by the office, and "the
threat" to unhampered execution of public office posed by potential
32
tort liability.
The Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to interfere in
the area of military affairs, stating that it is "difficult to conceive of an
area of governmental activity in which the courts have less com-

against him, the defendants had violated several of the plaintiff's constitutional
rights. Id. at 481-83. The district court dismissed the action on the ground
that the defendants were entitled, as federal officials, to absolute immunity for
all discretionary acts performed within the scope of their authority. Id. at 480.
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled only
to the qualified immunity available to state executive officials. Id. The qualified immunity of executive officers of state governments was established in
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
30. 438 U.S. at 507. The Court held that the Secretary and Assistant
Secretary of Agriculture enjoyed only a qualified immunity from suit and stated
that there was "[n]o . . . basis for holding . . . that executive officers generally
may with impunity discharge their duties in a way that is known to them to
violate the United States Constitution or ... a clearly established constitutional
The Court noted that "federal officials should enjoy no greater
rule." Id.
zone of protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do state
officers." Id. at 501 (emphasis by the Court). See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974).
31. 438 U.S. at 486. The Court stated that the agency officials who performed adjudicatory or prosecutorial functions within a federal agency should
be entitled to absolute immunity from liability. Id. at 508-17. Thus, the
Judicial Officer, the hearing examiner and agency attorney were not liable. Id.
The Court emphasized the importance for these agency officials to be able to
exercise independent judgment free from intimidation or harassment. Id. at
513-16.
The Court also upheld the absolute immunity traditionally extended to
judges and prosecutors. Id. at 508-10. Federal and state judges and prosecutors
have been historically exempt from liability for the consequences of acts done
in the exercise of their judicial and prosecutorial functions. See Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976);
Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam), aff'g, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926);
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
Congressmen are also immune from suit under the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6; Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
32. 438 U.S. at 497, citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
Butz resolved the question of whether all federal executive officials would enjoy
absolute immunity as some earlier cases had apparently seemed to suggest. In
1896, the Supreme Court, in granting absolute immunity to the Postmaster General, declared that the doctrine covered "heads of Executive Departments."
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896). Relying, in part, on this pronouncement, the Second Circuit held in 1949 that federal attorneys general and certain
agency heads were absolutely immune from liability for unconstitutional actions.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949). In Gregoire, suit was brought
against five federal officers (two successive United States Attorney-Generals, two
successive Directors of the Enemy Alien Control Unit of the Department of
Justice, and the District Director of Immigration at Ellis Island) to recover for
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petence." 8 Conscious of this admonition, the Court has held that suits
by servicemen against the United States for tortious acts committed by
their military superiors are not reviewable.3 4 In Feres v. United States 35
the false arrest of the plaintiff as an enemy alien, on the grounds that the arrest
and imprisonment were without authority of law, without cause, and in violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 579. Prior to Butz the
Supreme Court had extended an absolute privilege for statements made in a
press release by the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization in a libel
suit in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). The Court had also extended an
absolute privilege for statements made in an official memorandum by a naval
officer, addressed to his naval superiors, copies of which were sent to Congress.
Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959). See also Comment, Official Immunity
and Civil Liability for Constitutional Torts Committed By Military Commanders After Butz v. Economou, 89 MIL. L. REv. 25 (1980).
33. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). The Supreme Court has
noted that "[t]he military constitutes a specialized community governed by a
separate discipline from that of the civilian [and therefore] [o]rderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial
matters." Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953). See also Rostker v.
Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981); Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); Colson v. Bradley, 477 F.2d 639 (8th
Cir. 1973).
34. See notes 35-53 and accompanying text infra. The Third Circuit has
reasoned as follows:
If claims for injuries sustained by members of the armed forces in
the execution of military orders were subjected to the scrutiny of
courts of justice, then the civil courts would be required to examine
and pass upon the propriety of military decisions. The security and
common defense of the country would quickly disintegrate under such
meddling. "[A]ctions and essential military discipline would be impaired by subjecting the command to the public criticism and rebuke
of any member of the armed forces who chose to bring a suit against
the United States."
Jaffee I, 592 F.2d at 717, quoting Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520
(4th Cir. 1949), afJ'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
35. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The Supreme Court in Feres decided three
negligence cases together, since each involved a suit against the Government
by a serviceman for injuries sustained while on active duty and due to the
negligence of others in the armed forces. Id. at 138. Feres v. United States
was on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Jefferson v. United States was on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; and United States v. Griggs was on certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 137. In
Feres, the plaintiff's decedent died in a barracks fire while on active duty,
and his executrix brought suit against the United States to recover for his death,
alleging negligence in quartering Feres in barracks with a defective heating
plant and inadequate fire watch. Id. at 136-37. In Jefferson, the plaintiff
underwent an abdominal operation while in the Army and, about eight months
later, after he was discharged, a towel marked "Medical Department U.S.
Army" was found and removed from his stomach during another operation.
Id. at 137. Jefferson brought suit against the United States, alleging negligence
on the part of the army surgeon. Id. In Griggs, Griggs' executrix brought
suit against the United States, alleging that Griggs died while on active duty
due to negligent medical treatment by army surgeons. Id.
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this rule was extended to suits against the government, under the FTCA
for injuries to members of the armed forces sustained while on active
36
duty and resulting from the negligence of other military personnel.
The Feres Court held "that the Government is not liable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries
arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." 37 The
Court advanced four reasons in support of its holding.3 8 The Court
first noted that, since the FTCA made the Government liable only
under those circumstances which give rise to private liability, Congress
could not have intended to impose liability with respect to military
acts which have no counterpart in the civilian sector.39 Second, the
Court pointed out that Congress had provided, through the Veterans'
Benefits Act, a comprehensive and uniform compensation system for
those injured or killed in the armed force. 40 The Court further noted
that one of the reasons for the passage of the Act was to transfer the
36. Id. at 135.

37. Id. at 146. This restrictive interpretation of the FTCA by the Supreme Court has been often criticized, but its defenders point to the fact that
Congress has been aware of the Court's interpretation for many years since
the Feres decision in 1950 and has not seen fit to amend the Act in this respect.
Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 146, 156 (1977). For a discussion of Feres and its implications, see generally Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 1281
(1973); Comment, Torts-Rights of Servicemen Under Federal Torts Claim
[sic] Act, 45 N.C.L. REV. 1129 (1967); Note, Military Rights Under the Claims
Act-Injuries to Armed Services Personnel, 18 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1788
(1967); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to
FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (1979).
38. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text infra.
39. 340 U.S. at 141. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). The Court noted that
no American law has ever permitted a soldier to recover for negligence against
his superiors or against his government. 340 U.S. at 141.
40. 340 U.S. at 144. See also Jaffee 1, 592 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) ("Congress has enacted a rather comprehensive
system of benefits for military personnel and definite and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services, in addition to medical
and hospital treatment").
Under the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees' Claims Act, claims
against the United States for loss of property, personal injury, or death may
be settled and paid if the loss or injury was caused by an employee or member
of the armed services, or was otherwise incident to noncombat activities of the
military, but compensation for personal injury or death of an employee or
member of the armed services is not given if the injury or death was incident
to service. 592 F.2d at 716 n.7, citing 10 U.S.C. §§2733, 2735, 2736 (1976).
Claims against the United States for damages to the personal property of members of the armed services where the damage was incident to service is permitted under 31 U.S.C. §§ 241-243 (1976). Veterans' benefit legislation is found
at 38 U.S.C. §§301-362 (1976) (compensation for service-related liability or
death), 38 U.S.C. §§401-423 (1976) (dependency and indemnity compensation
for service-connected deaths), 38 U.S.C. §§ 501-562 (1976) (pensions for nonservice-related disability or death or for service), 38 U.S.C. §§ 601-654 (1976)
(hospital, domiciliary, and medical care), and 38 U.S.C. §§ 701-788 (1976) (life
insurance).
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burden of reviewing tort claims from Congress to the courts, but there
had been a dearth of private bills from the military.4 1 Finally, the
Court stated that the government-soldier relationship was "distinctively
federal in character" and should not be subject to variations in state
tort law.

42

Subsequently the Court, in United States v. Brown,43 rationalized
the Feres holding as follows:
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under
the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given
or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led
the Court to read that Act as excluding the claims of that
44
character [as in Feres].
Brown was a damages suit brought by a discharged veteran under the
FTCA to recover for negligent treatment in a Veterans Administration
41. 340 U.S. at 140.

See note 14 and accompanying text supra.

42. 340 U.S. at 142-44, quoting United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S.
301, 305 (1946). The Court also considered the fact that § 1346(b) of the
FTCA makes "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" govern
any consequent liability, and soldiers are not free to choose their locations in
determining whether Congress intended to make the Government liable for
service-related injuries under the Act. 340 U.S. at 142-44.
The Supreme Court reiterated these four principal reasons for the Feres
holding in United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159 (1963).
43. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
44. Id. at 112. For cases supporting the special government-soldier relationship basis for the Feres holding, see Knoch v. United States, 316 F.2d 532
(9th Cir. 1963); Schwager v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Healy v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 295 F.2d
958 (2d Cir. 1961). "[T]he threat to military discipline posed by maintenance
of a Federal Tort Claims action by a serviceman need not be a specific threat
in a particular situation, in order to bar governmental liability." Annot., 31
A.L.R. FED. 146, 157 (1977), citing Hall v. United States, 451 F.2d 353 (Ist
Cir. 1971); United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied.,
393 U.S. 1053 (1969); Callaway v. Garber, 289 F.2d 171 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 874 (1961). In Hall, the court applied Feres in affirming the
dismissal of a malpractice suit by a serviceman for injuries received in al
army hospital while on active service even though no military discipline was
involved. 451 F.2d at 354. In Callaway, the court applied Feres to bar recovery for the death of a serviceman who, while under orders, was riding in a
private automobile when struck and injured by another automobile operated
by a navy recruiting officer travelling on navy business even though the
reasons- underlying the Feres rule, as set forth in Brown, were inapplicable.
289 F.2d at 173-74. In Lee, the court stated that the reasons for the Feres
rule, as articulated in Brown, were not intended to be exclusive and that the
Supreme Court has never indicated that Feres should be limited to situations
which threaten military discipline. 400 F.2d at 564.
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The Supreme Court held that the veteran could recover

against the United States since the negligent act was "not incident to
service" but occurred after his discharge, even though his compensation
under the Veterans' Act had already been increased because of the
injury.

46

45. 348 U.S. at 110. The plaintiff injured his knee while on active duty
in the armed forces, but the operation during which an allegedly defective
tourniquet was used and which resulted in permanent impairment of the nerves
in his leg, occurred after his discharge from the service. Id. at 110-11. The
plaintiff had received a compensation award for his knee injury at the time of
his discharge and that award was increased after the last operation. Id. at 111.
46, Id. at 110-13. The Brown Court declared: "We adhere to the line
drawn in the Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not
arise out of or in the course of military duty." Id. at 113. The Court concluded that the receipt of disability payments under the Veterans Act was not
an election of remedies and did not preclude recovery under the FTCA but
only reduced the amount of any judgment under the latter Act. Id.
Prior to Feres, the Supreme Court had held that members of the armed
services could recover under the FTCA for injuries sustained not incident to
service. Brook v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). For cases following the
Brooks rule, see Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1974); Petition of
United States, 303 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D.N.C. 1969), afj'd, 432 F.2d 1357 (4th
Cir. 1970); Hand v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 38 (M.D. Ga. 1966); Downes
v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.N.C. 1965); Watt v. United States, 246
F. Supp. 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Sapp v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 496 (W.D.
La. 1957); Knecht v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd,
242 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1957); Snyder v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 585 (D. Md.
1953), af'd in part and modified in part as to damages, 218 F.2d 266 (4th Cir.
1954), rev'd and judgment of district court reinstated, 350 U.S. 906 (1955);
Barnes v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Ky. 1952); Brown v. United
States, 99 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.W. Va. 1951).
For serviceman's right to recover under the FTCA, see generally Annot.,
31 A.L.R. FED. 146 (1977).
Where servicemen were injured or killed incident to service, government
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act was barred and the comprehensive
military compensation laws provided by Congress were deemed to be the exclusive remedy. See Shaw v. United States, 448 F.2d 1240 (4th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969);
O'Neil v. United States, 202 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Degentesh v. United
States, 230 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Pettis v. United States, 108 F. Supp.
500 (N.D. Ca. 1952). However, the absence of a right to compensation under
the system established for military persons did not confer a right to recover
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 146, 157 (1977),
citing Healy v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y.). afj'd, 295 F.2d 958
(2d Cir. 1961).
Where injuries were not sustained incident to service, a serviceman could
recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act even though he received compensation under other federal statutes. See Archer v. United States, 217 F.2d 548
(9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 953 (1955); Snyder v. United States, 118
F. Supp. 585 (D. Md. 1953), afJ'd in part and modified in part as to damages,
218 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1954), rev'd and judgment of district court reinstated,
350 U.S. 906 (1955); Bandy v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 360 (D. Nev. 1950);
Alansky v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mon. 1948). However,
a judgment recovered by a serviceman under the FTCA for a nonservice incident injury was often reduced by the amount of compensation pursuant to
other laws. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954); Brooks v. United
States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949); Knecht v. United States, 242 F.2d 929 ((3d Cir.
1957); Archer v. United States, 217 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
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The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the Feres doctrine in
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 47 holding that the
United States was not liable under the FTCA to indemnify a third party
for damages paid by the latter to a member of the armed forces injured

in the course of military service. 48 The Court again emphasized that
the relationship between the government and its servicemen was federal
in nature, and that the Veterans' Benefits Act established a "no fault"
49
compensation scheme for injured servicemen.
Following the landmark decision in Feres, lower federal courts
universally accepted that decision as setting forth a doctrine of intramilitary immunity from suits against the government for injuries suffered
by servicemen incident to their service.5 0 The Feres doctrine has been
U.S. 953 (1955); Snyder v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 585 (D. Md. 1953),
aff'd in part and modified in part as to damages, 218 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1954),
rev'd and judgment of district court reinstated, 350 U.S. 906 (1955); Bandy v.
United States, 92 F. Supp. 360 (D. Nev. 1950); Alansky v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 77 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mon. 1948).
47. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). A National Guard officer was permanently injured when the ejection system of his fighter aircraft malfunctioned during a
midair emergency and he was forced to eject. Id. at 667. The ejection
system was manufactured by the Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation pursuant to government specifications and using government components. Id.
The officer was awarded a lifetime pension under the Veterans' Benefits Act for
the injury, but he brought a damage suit in federal district court against
the United States and Stencel Aero, alleging joint and individual negligence.
Id. at 668. Stencel Aero cross-claimed against the United States for indemnity.
Id. The district court granted the Government's motions for summary judgment against the officer and dismissed Stencel Aero's cross-claim, holding that
Feres barred both claims. Id. at 669. Dismissal of both claims was affirmed
by the Eighth Circuit. Id. See Donham v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 52
(D. Mon. 1975), afJ'd, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom., Stencel
Aero Eng'r Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
48. 431 U.S. at 666-67.
49. Id. at 671. First, the Court reasoned that the military relationship
between the United States and its servicemen, as well as the military-contractual
relationship between the United States and the corporate manufacturer, were
governed by federal law. Id. Next, the Court stated that the military compensation scheme in the Veterans' Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C. §321 (1976), provided an upper limit of liability for the Government as to service-related injuries. 431 U.S. at 673. The Court concluded that a third party indemnity
action against the government was barred, as would be a direct action by a
serviceman under Feres, since both cases "would involve second-guessing military
orders, and would often require members of the Armed Services to testify in
court as to each other's decisions and actions." Id.
50. Cases following Feres exist in every circuit. See, e.g., Garrett v. United
States, 625 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1363 (1981); Torres
v. United States, 621 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600
F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980); Stansberry v.
Middendorf, 567 F.2d 617 (4th Cir. 1978); Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d
955 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Hass v. United States,
518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Joseph v. United States, 505 F.2d 525 (7th
Cir. 1974); Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 963 (1975); Beaucoudray v. United States, 490 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1974);
Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879
(1973); Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
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extended to bar suits in several situations, including suits against individual federal officials, both military and civilian,5 ' suits for intentional
U.S. 819 (1973); De Font v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 910 (1972); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Lowe v. United States, 440 F.2d 452 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971); United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558
(9th Cir. 1968),.cer't. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969); Ulmer v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 380 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1967); Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th
Cir. 1967); Sheppard v. United States, 369 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 982 (1967); United States v. Carroll, 369 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1966);
Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1965); United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Harris v.
United States, 308 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1962); Layne v. United States, 295 F.2d
433 (7th Cir. 1961), cert.. denied, 368 U.S. 990 (1962); Callaway v. Garber, 289
F.2d 171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 874 (1961); Becton v. United States,
489 F. Supp. 134 (D. Mass. 1980); Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp.
429 (E.D. Va. 1980); Eckles v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Pa. 1979);
Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979); Watkins v. United
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd, 587 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1979);
Pisciotta v. Ferrando, 428 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Camassar v. United
States, 400 F. Supp. 894 (D. Conn. 1975), af'd, 531 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir. 1976);
McCord v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 953 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), afJ'd, 477 F.2d
599 (6th Cir. 1973); Morgan v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Fla.
1973); Glorioso v. United States, 331 F. Supp. I (N.D. Miss. 1971); Redmond v.
United States, 331 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Pratt v. United States, 207
F. Supp. 132 (D. Mass. 1962); Healy v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 325
(S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 295 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1961); Drumgoole v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 170 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Va. 1959).
• The only real dispute seems to be over the meaning of the phrase "incident
to service." See Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 146, 156-57 (1977). The question of
what injuries to servicemen are "incident to service" is one of fact. Hass v.
United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975). The "incident to service" test
is said to be much broader than the "disabled in line of duty" test for statutory
benefits for naval reservists injured during inactive duty training. United
States v. Carroll, 369 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1966). The "incident to service" test
also has been held to be broader than the "scope of employment" test for
respondeat superior purposes. Callaway v. Garber, 289. F.2d 171, 173 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 874 (1961). In determining whether an injury to
a serviceman arose in the line of duty, one court has found the determinative
question to be whether at the time of the injury he was subject to military
discipline. Knight v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Tenn. 1972),
afJ'd without opinion, 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973). A serviceman has been
deemed to be engaged in "activity incident to military service" when he was
travelling by military transportation, to a military reserve drill, in uniform,
and subject to military courtesies and discipline. United States v. Carroll,
369 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1966). See also Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d
134 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1981); Joseph v. United States,
505 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1974); Mariano v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 316 (E.D.
Va.), all'd, 605 F.2d 721 (1979).
51. See Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980); Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir.
1975); Tirrill v. McNamara, 451 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lee,
400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969); Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967); Bailey v.
Van Buskirk, 345 F. 2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 948 (1966);
Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), affd mem. on other
grounds, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pisciotta v. Ferrando, 428 F. Supp.
685 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). It has been said that the status of the injured or deceased serviceman controls, and not that of the tortfeasor, and, therefore,
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torts arising Out of or incident to service,52 and suits for unconstitutional
torts committed incident to service.53
An example of the last category of the Feres extensions is Nagy v.
United States.54 In Nagy, the district court held that a former serviceman could not sue the United States or individual federal officials on
constitutional grounds for alleged injuries arising out of his participation, while in the service, in LSD experiments, stating that "[a]n action
sounding in constitutional, as opposed to common law, tort is not
exempt from application of the Feres doctrine." 55 The court reasoned
if the injury or death was connected with the military, there can be no recovery under the FTCA. Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d at 1254.
52. See Citizens Nat'l Bank of Waukegan v. United States, 594 F.2d
1154 (7th Cir. 1979); Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318. (S.D. Ohio
1980); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), afl'd mern. on.
other grounds, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In Citizens National Bank,
the court stated that "the Feres holding that 'the government is not liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where injuries
arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service' applies with
equal vitality to negligent and intentional torts." 594 F.2d at 1157 (footnote
omitted). In Misko, the court stated that "[a]ny other result would mean that
the Feres-based immunity of armed forces medical officers could be abrogated
through an exercise in pleading." 453 F. Supp. at 515. In Everett, the
Feres doctrine was a pplied to bar an intentional tort action by the surviving
spouse of an enlisted man who was ordered to march through a nuclear blast
area less than an hour after detonation of a nuclear device, resulting in exposure to large and hazardous doses of radiation, from which the enlisted
man allegedly was stricken with cancer and died. 492 F. Supp. at 319-22.
53. See Jaffee 1, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979),
Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Schnurman v.
United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F.
Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980); Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C.
1979); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979); Misko v.
United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem. on. other grounds,
593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46 (D. Conn.
1971), aff'd, 455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972). In Schnurman, the Feres doctrine
was held to bar recovery under the FTCA against the Government for injuries allegedly resulting from the plaintiff's exposure without his knowledge or
consent to toxic war gases during a navy experiment in 1944. 490 F. Supp. at
436-38. In Misko, the court held that an action by a former National Guard
officer against the United States and certain army medical officers was barred by
the intramilitary immunity doctrine by Feres, even though the cause of action
was brought directly under the fifth amendment. 453 F. Supp. at 514-16. In
Thornwell, a former serviceman was not allowed to recover for injuries received
while on active duty even though he alleged that he was subjected to a "covert
program in human [drug] experimentation" while in the service in violation of
his constitutional rights. 471 F. Supp. at 345-47.
It has been said that "it is the status of the claimant as a serviceman
rather than the legal theory of his claim which governs in such cases." Rotko
v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. at 47. Cf. Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (Feres
doctrine triggered by "factual situation" of serviceman injured incident to
service by military or government personnel, rather than by legal theory underlying plaintiff's claim).
54. 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979).
55. Id. at 384, citing Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C.
1978), aff'd mem. on other grounds, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Jaffee v.
United States, 468 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.J. 1979).
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that any other result would allow a plaintiff to avoid "the Feres-based
immunity of armed forces medical officers . . . through an exercise in
pleading." 56
In the Third Circuit, cases subsequent to Feres have been decided
by mechanical application of the "incident to service" test to preclude
suits brought against the government under the FTCA where the negli57
Both the
gent acts arose out of or in the course of military service.
court of appeals and the district courts have focused on the status of the
serviceman, 58 and have even applied Feres to bar a common law negligence suit against an army surgeon r39and a suit involving negligence on
the part of civilian, rather than military, officials.60 The Third Circuit,
while considering itself bound by Feres, has twice invited the Supreme
61
Court to modify or reverse Feres.

62

States,

Recently, in Hinkie v. United

a district court within the Third Circuit rejected the "incident

56. 471 F. Supp. at 384, quoting Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513,
515 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem. on other grounds, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
57. See, e.g., Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Sheppard v. United States, 369
F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982 (1967); Eckles v. United
States, 471 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
58. See Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 777 (3d Cir.

1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Sheppard v. United States, 294 F.
Supp. 7, 9 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
59. See Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
923 (1967). In Bailey, the court stated that although the Feres line of cases
were actions against the government under the FTCA, the "same policy considerations" governed an action against an army surgeon based on common law
negligence principles. 375 F.2d at 74.
60. See Sheppard v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1969). In
Sheppard, the district court stated that "substitution of negligent non-military
personnel in place of military personnel" made no difference with regard to
the applicability of Feres where the decedents were on active duty at time of
death. Id. at 9.
61. See Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973). In Peluso, the Third Circuit stated: "Only the
Supreme Court can reverse [Feres]. While we would welcome that result we
are not hopeful in view of the number of recent instances in which, having
been afforded the opportunity, it declined to grant certiorari. Possibly the only
route to relief is by an application to Congress." 474 F.2d at 606. In Thomason, the Third Circuit repeated that sentiment: "[I]t is the effect of the Feres
doctrine-which turns on plaintiff's status-which produces the hardship in this
case. And, as we have stated previously, only the Supreme Court can overrule,
or modify, Feres." 539 F.2d at 960, citing Peluso v. United States, 474 U.S.
at 606.
62. 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The Hinkie court held that an
action against the United States by the family of a former serviceman who was
allegedly negligently exposed to harmful doses of radiation during Army nuclear
testing, was not barred under Feres when the plaintiffs alleged direct injury to
themselves, independent of any injury to the serviceman. Id. at 278-85.
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to service" test in favor of an analysis based on the applicability of the
Feres rationale and allowed a negligence suit by the family of a deceased
serviceman against the Army.6 3 The court reasoned that the three
factors justifying the Feres holding, as set out in Stencel Aero, did not
apply since there was nothing "distinctively federal" about the government's relationship to the family members, the veterans' compensation
scheme was unlikely to compensate them, and allowing them to bring
64
suit did not threaten military discipline.
Against this background. the Third Circuit addressed the question
of "whether the principles which led to the development of military
immunity counsel against the finding of a new cause of action directly
under the Constitution against individual government defendants for
intentional and unconstitutional torts occurring incident to military
service." 65 In attempting to predict how the Supreme Court would
resolve the issue, the Jaffee II court engaged in a three-part analysis.16
Initially, the court examined the standard for finding a cause of
action directly under the Constitution as established by the Supreme
Court in Bivens, 67 and subsequently delineated in Davis 68 and Carlson.6 9
The Jaffee II court determined that these cases allow a private cause of
action for damages to be brought against federal officials in federal court
for constitutional violations, unless one of two exceptions apply.70 The
court found the first exception to be where Congress has explicitly provided an alternate remedy. 7 ' The second exception applies when there
63. Id. at 282.
64. Id. at 282-84, citing Stencel Aero Eng'r Corp. v. United States, 431

U.S. 666, 671-73 (1977). For a discussion of Feres, see notes 35-44 and accompanying text supra.
65. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 4 (emphasis supplied by the court). The
court held that there was no cause of action under the Constitution in this
case. Id.
66. Id. Judge Higginbotham, writing for the majority, stated that "we
cannot avoid our obligation to forecast or predict how the [Supreme] Court will
decide troubling cases involving new factual situations." Id. He referred to
the United States Supreme Court cases on which the majority would rely as
"barometers" to aid in the prediction. Id.
67. For a discussion of Bivens, see notes 16-27 and accompanying text

supra.
68. For a discussion of Davis, see notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text
supra.

69. For a discussion of Carlson, see notes 22-28 and accompanying text
supra.
70. Jaffee II, supra note *,at 8, citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396-87. See notes 26 & 27
and accompanying text supra.
71. Jafyee II, supra note 0, at 9. This exception applies whenever "'Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a
substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective.'" Id., quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (emphasis
in original).
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are "special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress." 72
The court next looked at the rationale used in cases interpreting
the liability of the federal government under the Tort Claims ActJ 3
The court noted that the Feres rule of government immunity under the
Act for injuries to servicemen sustained incident to service was supported
by two rationales. 74 The primary rationale was that suits for service
related injuries would affect both "the willingness of military personnel
to follow decisions of their superiors" and "the decisionmaking of military authorities who give orders." 75 The second rationale was that
Congress had already provided a uniform and comprehensive system of
no-fault compensation for injuries sustained incident to service.76 The
court noted that, although the present case was distinguishable from
Feres in that Feres was a negligence suit against the government,77 the
reasoning behind the Feres decision was equally applicable to a suit
against government officials for intentional torts. 78 In applying these
72. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 10, quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396.
73. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 10. The court noted that the decisions in
this area have only considered whether Congress had waived sovereign immunity
for the federal government under the Act; however, the court stated that the
rationale adopted by the Supreme Court could aid in a determination of
whether a cause of action could be implied under the Constitution. Id. at
10-11. For a discussion of the Tort Claims Act, see notes 12-15 and accom-,
panying text supra.
74. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 11-13. See notes 75 & 76 and accompanying
text infra.
75. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 11-12, citing United States v. Brown, 348
U.S. 110 (1954); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). For a discussion
of Brown, see notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra.
76. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 12-13. For discussion of the military compensation scheme, see note 40 and accompanying text supra.
77. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 15-17. For a discussion of Feres, see notes
35-44 and accompanying text supra. Jaffee H involved an intentional unconstitutional tort claim against individual government officials. See notes 1-9
and accompanying text supra.
78. Jaffee H, supra note *, at 15-18. The first distinction, the fact that
the suit was against individual government officials rather than against the
government, was, according to the court, a "stronger argument for not allowing
suit than in Feres." Id. at 15 (emphasis supplied by the court). The court reasoned that suits against individuals in government "[chill] responsible decisionmaking" on their part, and also make them unjustly liable for discretionary
acts performed within the scope of their office. Id. at 15-16, citing Butz v.
Economoti, 438 U.S. at 497. The court also pointed out that the Third Circuit had previously barred a common law negligence suit by a serviceman
against an army surgeon for alleged malpractice in an operation performed in
an army hospital while the plaintiff was on active duty, on the grounds that
service suits threaten military discipline regardless of whether the government
or individuals were sued. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 16-17, citing Bailey v.
DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967). For cases
applying.Feres to suits by servicemen against government officials, see note 51
and accompanying text supra.
The second distinction, the fact that the present suit was for intentional
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rationales to Jaffee's claim, the Third Circuit concluded that various
policy reasons did exist for hesitating to hold individual government
officials liable for damage for intentional and unconstitutional torts. 70
In the final step of its analysis, the Jaffee II court examined whether
the policy concerns behind the Feres line of cases would support a new
implied cause of action under the Constitution against government
officials for intentional unconstitutional torts.80 The court concluded
that the Supreme Court would find that "special factors" were present
in this case, which counseled against finding a constitutional cause of
action in the absence of congressional direction.81 In support of this
conclusion, the court referred to the threat to military discipline and
82
decisionmaking posed by suits against individuals for intentional torts.
In addition, the court reasoned that the existence of the alternative
remedy provided by the comprehensive military compensation system
supported judicial restraint. s3
unconstitutional torts rather than negligent torts, was found by the Jaffee II
court to be a stronger argument for applying the Feres rationale of protecting
military discipline and decisionmaking since intentional military action would
often be more dependent on discretionary military decisionmaking "than the
adequacy of housing or medical care involved in Feres." Jaffee II, supra note*,
at 17. The court also noted that the sometimes difficult distinction between
negligent and intentional acts would make cases turn on the wording of the
complaint. Id. at 17-18. For cases applying Feres to intentional tort suits, see
note 52 and accompanying text supra.
79. Jaflee II, supra note *, at 18. The court pointed out that several
other courts have extended the Feres doctrine of intramilitary immunity to
intentional unconstitutional torts committed by government officials. Id. See
note 53 and accompanying text supra.
80. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 19-21. For a discussion of the Bivens standard for constitutional torts, see notes 16-27 and accompanying text supra.
81. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 19-20. With regard to these "special factors," the court stated: "The Court has repeatedly identified the deleterious
effects of service related suits on military performance. As recently as three
years ago, it noted that the relationship between the government and 'members of its Armed Forces is unlike any relationship of any private individuals.' "
Id. at 19, quoting Stencel Aero Eng'r Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. at 670.
82. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 20. The court stated that "the underlying
rationale of Feres would appear to establish a bright line rule that would not
admit of an exception in this case." Id. at 20-21. For a discussion of Feres
and subsequent cases following Feres, see notes 35-53 and accompanying text
supra.
83. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 21. The court noted that soldiers injured
incident to service were guaranteed compensation under the Veterans' Benefits Act. Id. For an outline of the compensation provisions of the Veterans'
Benefits Act, see note 40 supra. The court later pointed out that "[i]t is important to remember that what we are called upon to decide is simply whether
the plaintiffs are entitled to money damages, in addition to the compensation
provided by Veterans' Benefits ..
" Jaflee II, supra note *, at 28. The court
also noted that Congress had not amended the FTCA in the many years since
the Supreme Court restrictively interpreted the Act in Feres. Id. at 21.
Although the court offered the alternative remedy argument, it believed
that the "special factors" analysis was the better approach. Id. at 23-24. The
court also referred to the Supreme Court's reluctance to review military decisions in other contexts. Id. at 22-23, citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct.
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The Third Circuit was careful to note that it was not impliedly
creating "intra-service immunity" by its decision not to recognize a constitutional cause of action 84 and that Congress could still pass a statute
establishing a federal cause of action.8 The court emphasized that the
issue was simply whether the plaintiffs were entitled to money damages
in addition to the compensation received under the Veterans' Benefits
Act.86
In a concurring opinion, Judge Hunter s7 took issue only with the
majority's attempt to forecast how the United States Supreme Court
would resolve the issue, stating that it was the court's job "to arrive at
an independent decision based upon a reasoned analysis of applicable
legal precepts and precedents." 88
In a separate opinion, Judge Adams agreed with the majority's decision not to imply a constitutional cause of action, but disagreed with
their reliance on the "special factors" approach.89 He argued that
under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Davis, 0 resolution of the
"special factors" issue was congruent with the military immunity issue
2646 (1981); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345
U.S. 83 (1953).
84. Jaffee II, supra note 0, at 23. The court stated: "Our decision not
to recognize a constitutional cause of action is not, as the dissent suggests, an
implicit creation of an intraservice immunity .. " Id. Because of its disposition of the case the court found it unnecessary to "address the grounds adopted
by the district court that the defendants are immune from suit." Id. at 8.
See notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
85. Jaffee II, supra note *,at 28. The court stated that it was "hold[ing]
only that these are special circumstances where a court should not act against
or independently of congressional direction." Id.
86. Jlfee II, supra note *,at 28. See note 40 and accompanying text
supra. The court called this case a "difficult and troubling decision," but concluded that "[m]ilitary service appears to be a situation where the [Supreme]
Court would not independently grant a new cause of action under the Constitution." Jaffee II, supra note *,at 27. The court also disposed of Jaffee's
state law claims by holding that there was no state cause of action for the
same reasons that barred a federal cause of action-namely, "the effect of such
suits on military operations and the availability of alternative reimbursement
through Veterans' Benefits." Id. at 25-26.
87. Judge Aldisert joined the concurrence.
88. Jaffee II, supra note *,at 29 (Hunter, J., concurring). Judge Hunter
stated that "our responsibility is to decide the case in the way that we think
is right-right because we believe it to be right-and not because we project
that the Supreme Court might agree with our decision." Id. at 29 (Hunter, J.,
concurring).
89. Jaflee II, supra note *,at 30-32 (Adams, J., concurring in part). See
notes 72-83 and accompanying text supra.
90. For a discussion of Davis, see notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text
supra. Judge Adams noted that in Davis, the Supreme Court held that a sex
discrimination suit brought under the fifth amendment's due process clause
against a Congressman raised "special factors counseling hesitation" which were
"coextensive with the protection which the Speech or Debate Clause affords,"

and that, in the absence of immunity under that clause, the Congressman
would be liable as a private citizen. Jaffee II,supra note *, at 31 (Adams,
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and, therefore, the court should first allow a cause of action under the
9
The better
Constitution and then decide the immunity question.
the
alternative
focus
on
approach, according to Judge Adams, would
92
Under this analysis, he conremedy aspect of the Bivens standard.
cluded that Congress' establishment of a comprehensive benefits scheme
for injuries sustained in the military service was intended to be fully
adequate compensation for servicemen, thus precluding an implied
constitutional remedy.0
In a strong dissent, Judge Gibbons m condemned the "involuntary
human experimentation" by government officials upon soldiers under
their control without legitimate reason, as violative of the soldiers'
constitutional rights. 95 The dissent argued that the two rationales
offered by the majority for removing the class of soldiers from the law's
J., concurring in part), citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). See
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6
91. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 31-32 (Adams, J., concurring in part). Judge
Adams stated that "the [Supreme] Court's analysis [in Davis] appeared to
render disposition of the 'special factors' issue inseparable from resolution
of the immunity question." Id. at 31 (Adams, J., concurring in part). Thus,
under that reasoning, military officials, like legislators, would be liable for
wrongdoing, absent immunity. Id. at 32 (Adams, J., concurring in part).
Therefore, according to Judge Adams, the majority should initially allow
Jaffee to assert a cause of action under the Constitution and then resolve the
question of government immunity under Feres with respect to intentional
torts. Id. See notes 106-08 and accompanying text infra.
92. Jaffee I1, supra note *, at 32-40 (Adams, J., concurring in part).
the Bivens standard, see notes 16-27 and accompanying text supra.

For

93. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 38-39 (Adams, J., concurring in part). Judge
Adams concluded "that a suit for damages asserted directly under 'the Constitution is barred when Congress has devised a compensation scheme intended
to provide adequate benefits for injured parties." Id. at 40 (Adams, J., concurring in part) (emphasis supplied by Judge Adams). He noted, however,
that a party could recover such benefits and still bring suit under a nonconstitutional provision of federal law. Id. at 40-41 (Adams, J., concurring in
part). Also, Judge Adams disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
federal compensation scheme necessarily preempted state remedies and stated
that he would remand the case for that reason only. Id. at 41-43 (Adams, J.,
concurring in part).
94. Judge Sloviter joined in the dissent.
95. Jaffee II, supra *, at 44-48 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons
stated:
These allegations charge a violation of human rights on a massive scale. The plaintiffs seek to prove, and we must at this stage
assume that they can, that civilian and military officials of the government, acting without legal authority and with no sufficient legitimate
military or other purpose, conducted a human experiment upon
soldiers subject to their control, without their knowledge, permission
or consent, by exposing them to radiation which those officials knew
to be dangerous.
Id. at 45 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). He argued that the tortious conduct alleged by the Jaffees "would violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Geneva Convention, the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Sub-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss3/13

42

Editors: Torts
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27: p. 858

protection against intentional torts were questionable, and that the
"real but unarticulated reason" was to "encourage concealment" of
military affairs.0 6 With regard to the first rationale, the dissent looked
to the case law on personal immunity of federal officials 9 and concluded that there was no absolute intramilitary immunity for individual
defendants against suits for intentional torts brought by injured servicemen. 98 In addition, the dissent noted that "statutory military policy
jected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishments, and the Nuremberg Code." Id. at 47-48 (Gibbons, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).
Judge Gibbons, after criticizing the majority for affirming the dismissal of
the complaint on completely different grounds, without briefing from either
party, phrased the majority's holding as follows: "Under federal or under
state law a charge by a serviceman that he was subjected to the intentional
tort of involuntary human experimentation, without legal authority and without military justification, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted in any court." Id. at 47 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 48-49 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The dissent characterized the
two rationales offered by the majority as "military necessity" (need for military discipline and aggressive decisionmaking by military superiors), and
congressional intent as evidenced by veterans' benefits legislation. Id. Judge
Gibbons further divided the "military necessity justification" into two parts:
"the need for encouraging unquestioned obedience by inferiors (the "serviceman as automation principle"); and the need for aggressiveness in decisionmaking by military superiors (the "macho principle")." Id. at 49 (Gibbons,

J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 50-67 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons delineated two
lines of authority which culminated in the present case. Id. at 51 (Gibbons,
J., dissenting). One was the Feres line of cases, establishing intramilitary immunity. Id. For a discussion of Feres and subsequent cases, see notes 35-53
and accompanying text supra. The other line of cases developed the law of
personal immunity of federal officials for intentional torts from the absolute
immunity intimated in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950), and the qualified immunity expressly established in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). For a discussion of Butz,
see notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra. See also Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306 (1973); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Hoard v. Lyons, 360
U.S. 593 (1959).
98. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 67 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons stated that "[t]he immunity of military superiors is the same as, but no
more than, the qualified immunity afforded to other members of the executive
branch." Id. In support of this proposition, he cited Howard v. Lyons, 360
U.S. 593 (1959) (military officer treated same as civilian defendants for purposes of immunity); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877) (army captain liable
in damages for confiscating plaintiffs' liquor even though acting to enforce
han on alcohol in Indian Territory); Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 389 (1851) (vessel captain not absolutely immune from suit by serviceman for intentional torts); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804)
(commander of American warship liable for damages for unlawful seizure of
neutral vessels even though acting upon presidential instructions). Jaffee II,
supra note *, at 58-67 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons argued that
the qualified immunity line of cases undercut the "serviceman as automaton
principle" aspect of the military necessity rationale for the majority's opinion.
Id. at 67 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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encourage complaints about and redress of intramilitary wrongs." 9t,
Turning to the second rationale, Judge Gibbons argued that the availability of military compensation benefits for service-related injuries did
not support the majority's holding 100 since Congress never expressed
an intent that they preempt federal or state tort actions.' 01 In conclu02
sion, the dissent argued for allowing the constitutional damages action,
emphasizing that "lack of military accountability" posed a greater danger
to a democracy than "lack of military discipline or aggressiveness." 0.3
It is submitted that the result reached by the Jaffee II court is consistent with federal precedent in the area of tort recovery for servicerelated injuries, 1°4 but that the court's resolution of the issue within a
Bivens framework marks an unsupported departure from the Feres-type
review of military injury. 105 The Jaffee II court avoided resolution of
the intramilitary immunity question by basing its decision on tlhe
99. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 69 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons argued that statutory authority also repudiated the "serviceman as automaton" rationale, stating that "[t]he Uniform Code of Military Justice and its
predecessors-the Articles of War and the Articles for the Government of the
avy-far from discouraging complaints of wrongs committed by military
superiors, affirmatively encourage them." Id. at 67-68 (Gibbons, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted), citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 938, 939.
100. For a discussion of the majority's holding, see notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
101. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 79 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons rejected both the "special factors counseling hesitation" exception and
the adequate "alternative remedy" exception, and thus would recognize a
federal constitutional cause of action under the Bivens, Davis, and Carlson.
decisions. Id. at 73-74 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See notes 16-27 and accompaniying text supra. He stated that Congress did not indicate anywhere
in the veterans' compensation provisions that the legislation was to be an
exclusive remedy for injured serviceman and that a damages suit was thereby
precluded., Jaffee II, supra note *,at 74-78 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 81 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons stated that the
complaint should be allowed under either federal or state law since, in the
absence of absolute intra-military immunity, the rationale for rejecting a Bivens
cause of action would be equally inapplicable to the pendent state law claim.
Id. at 79-81 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 84 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons also agreed with
Judge Hunter's objection to the majority's attempt to predict how the United
States Supreme Court would decide the same case, and added that the majority's result amounted to nothing more than "gratuitous libel." Id. at 83-84
(Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Judge Hunter's concurrence,
see note 88 and accompanying text supra.
104. For the holding of the Jaffee II court, see text accompanying note
10 supra. For a discussion of government liability for service-related injuries,
see notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
105. It should also be noted that, as the dissent pointed out, the majority decided the case on a theory neither brought up in the lower court, nor
briefed-by either party. Jaffee II, supra note *,at 47 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
See note 95 supra. For a discussion of Bivens, see notes 16-27 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Feres, see notes 35-44.and accompanying
text supra.
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"special factors counseling hesitation" exception to an implied cause
of action under the Constitution. 10 The fallacy of using this approach
in light of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Davis was pointed out by
Judge Adams. 107 Applying the Davis Court's reasoning, the Jaffee H
court could not have utilized the "special factors" exception without
deciding the immunity issue. 108
It is also contended that the additional rationale offered by the
Jaffee II court premised on the "alternate remedy" exception to a constitutional cause of action is weak support for its decision. 10 9 Although
the court characterized the suit as a dispute over "the amount of money

the plaintiffs may recover" 110 and, hence, reasoned that the compensation under the Veterans' Benefits Act provided adequate relief,"' it is
submitted that the court overlooked the fact that suits for injuries are
brought not only to recover damages, but also to vindicate legal and
constitutional rights which have been violated. 112 Furthermore, as the
dissent indicated, there is no clear indication in the veterans' benefits
legislation that Congress intended the FTCA to create an "exclusive
remedy." 113 In short, since the Bivens standard presumes a federal
106. Jaffee II, supra note 0, at 8. The court stated that "because of our
disposition of these issues, we need not address the grounds adopted by the
district court that the defendants are immune from suit." Id. The court
later emphasized that it was not impliedly creating "an intra-service immunity"
with its holding. Id. at 23. For a discussion of the majority's opinion, see
notes 80-86 and accompanying text supra.
107. For a discussion of Judge Adams' separate opinion, see notes 89-93
and accompanying text supra. In Davis, the Supreme Court stated that the
"special factors" concerns were "coextensive" with the speech and debate clause
protections, and that absence of the immunity under this clause would make
legislators liable like other citizens. 442 U.S. at 246. For a further discustion of Davis, see notes 20 8c21 and accompanying text supra.
108. See Jaffee 1, supra note *, at 32 (Adams, J., concurring in part).
Judge Adams stated that "it would appear equally true of military officials

as of legislators that, absent immunity, they should be held accountable for

violations of legal norms." Id. See note 31 supra.
109. For a summary of this argument, see note 83 and accompanying text
supra.
I10. See Jaffee II, supra note *,at 28.
Ill. Jaffee II, supra note *, at 21. For summary of this argument, see
text accompanying note 83 supra.
112. The majority focused on the compensation recovered by Jaffee for
his service-related injuries without discussion of the legality of the tortious
acts which resulted in such injuries and relied on the need for military discipline and unfettered decisionmaking rationales of Feres. See Jaflee II, supra
note *,at 19-20. They also noted the reluctance of courts to review military
affairs. See id. at 22-23; notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text supra.
By contrast, the dissent's arguments focused on rights which have been
violated, emphasizing the illegality of the defendants' conduct and the need

to provide a forum for plaintiff's grievances. See Jaffee II, supra note *, at
44-85 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See notes 94-103 and accompanying text supra.
113. Jaffee II, supra note *,at 74-79 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Veterans' Benefits Act, see note 40 and accompanying text supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

45

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 13

1981-82]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

cause of action under the Constitution in the absence of either of the
two exceptions, 114 it is submitted that a Bivens analysis would support
the Jaffee II court's position only if service immunity initially had been
established. 115
Whenever the military is involved in litigation, special deference
has been called for and the tendency of the courts has been toward nonreviewability of these suits. 16 Thus, it is suggested that extension of
the Feres doctrine of intramilitary immunity to cover intentional torts
would be more in line with precedent in the area of military affairs "l1
than using the Feres rationale under the "special factors" analysis."18
Even though the present case was an intentional tort suit against govern9
ment officials, and is therefore distinguishable from Feres,"1
other courts
120
have extended Feres to bar such suits.
Furthermore, there is authority
to the effect that it is the status of the claimant as a serviceman that
controls, and not the identity of the defendant or the legal theory supporting the claim. 12' In fact, the Third Circuit previously relied on Feres
122
to bar negligence suits by injured servicemen against the government.
It is suggested that the Jaffee II court's reluctance to extend the
Feres immunity doctrine in these circumstances is due to the arguably
reprehensible nature of the alleged tortious conduct. 123 When characterized as "involuntary human experimentation," the acts in question
114. For a discussion of the two exceptions, see notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
115. For a discussion of the Bivens analysis, see notes 16-27 and accompanying text supra.
116. For cases involving judicial review of military decisions, see note 33
supra.

117. For a discussion of Feres and its line of cases, see notes 35-53 and
accompanying text supra.
118. For a summary of the Jaffee II court's analysis of this issue, see notes
65-86 and accompanying text supra.
119. For a discussion of how the cases are distinguishable, see notes 77 &
78 and accompanying text supra.
120. See note 52 supra.
121. For a discussion of this authority, see note 51 supra.
122. See Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Sheppard v. United States, 369 F.2d (3d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982 (1967). Cf. Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d
712, 716 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) (Feres cited with approval); Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72 .(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
923 (1967) (common law negligence suit barred against army surgeon for
alleged malpractice in operation in army hospital while plaintiff as on active
duty). For a discussion of Third Circuit cases involving military torts, see
notes 57-64 and accompanying text supra.
123. For details of the Jaffees' complaint, see notes 3-4 and accompanying
text supra.
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take on sinister connotations. 12 4 It is submitted that the court's extremely deferential approach gives Congress the responsibility for dealing with questionable military conduct and for providing a forum for
injured claimants in Jaffee's position. 25 It is further contended that
the cautious attitude of the Jaffee I court in basing its decision on a
forecast of how the Supreme Court would resolve the same case, shifts
to the Court the onus for the harsh results of this holding and further
manifests the Jaffee II court's reluctance to sanction the intentional
actions alleged in Jaffee's complaint, 126 Finally, as suggested by the
concurrence, the Jalee II court should have decided the case based upon
what it reasoned the correct result to be, and not upon a prediction of
127
how the Supreme Court would decide the same case.
The clear impact of Jaffee II is to bar servicemen's suits for intentional military torts in the Third Circuit. However, it is contended
that the question of intramilitary immunity with respect to intentional
torts is still open in the Third Circuit. 2 8 A more subtle effect of
Jaffee II is to warn courts of the extremes to which the Feres rationale
may be applied to immunize questionable military activities. 129 The
widely divergent opinions sharply illustrate the legal and ethical issues
involved in the area of servicemen's recovery in tort against the government and their military superiors. 130 It is submitted that the tendency
124. See Jalee I1, supra note *, at 48 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).

For a

summary of the dissenting opinion, see notes 94-103 and, accompanying text
supra. Although the dissent's reference to the "radical totalitarianism" of the
majority's result seems overstated, the tendency of cases following Feres (or
its rationale) do seem to suggest that servicemen sign away their constitutional
rights upon enlistment. See Jaffee II, supra note *, at 48 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For cases following Feres, see notes 50-53 supra.
125. The majority stated: "Any decision on whether claims of the plaintiffs should be converted to a cause of action, however, should be reserved for
Congress to make in these special circumstances." Jalee II, supra note 0, at 4.
The court later held that "these are special circumstances where a court should
not act against or independently of congressional direction." Id. at 28.
126. See id. at 4.
127. See id. at 29 (Hunter, J., concurring), id. at 83 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). It is submitted that it does indeed seem "questionable whether
... a court of review would find it helpful to be presented with the prediction
of its own future trends, rather than with a direct statement of the lower court's
reasoned review on law and policy." Id. at 29 (Hunter, J.', concurring), quoting
Decisions, Interstate Commerce-State Franchise Tax on Foreign Corporation
Engaged Solely in Interstate Commerce, 44 COLUM. L. REV. '565, 570 (1944).
For a discussion of the concurrence, see note 88 and accompanying text supra.
128. For a discussion of Third Circuit precedent in this area, see notes
57-64 and accompanying text supra. It is also noted that the value of Ialee
II as guidance for the lower courts is not clear since the majority, although
agreeing in result, is split in regard to the proper rationale.
129. For the history of the Feres doctrine, see notes 35-53 and accompanying text supra.
130. For summaries of the various Jaffee II opinions, see notes 65-103
and accompanying text supra.
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of the courts to blindly adhere to the Feres doctrine of intramilitary
immunity may be checked by the opinions in this case. 131 Furthermore,
since there are few decisions at the federal appellate level dealing
directly with intentional constitutional military torts, other circuits may
choose to adopt the Bivens-type analysis utilized by the majority to avoid
32
resolution of the Feres immunity issue in these circumstances.
In conclusion, Jalee 1H raises disturbing questions about the accountability of government officials, both military and civilian, for the
consequences of military decisions. It raises additional questions about
the extent to which the Feres doctrine can be used to insulate such
officials from liability, and the reconciliability of the Bivens standard
with the Feres doctrine in the area of military torts. It is contended
that the Third Circuit's raising of these important questions places the
burden on the Supreme Court to resolve them in a manner which will
3
provide guidance to the lower courts in the future.
Wei-Wei Chiu
131. For cases following Feres, see notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.

132. It seems that the only circuits to approve application of Feres to
intentional and/or constitutional torts have been the second, seventh, and ninth
circuits. See Citizens Nat'l Bank of Waukegan v. United States, 594 F.2d 1154
(7th Cir. 1979); Calhoun v. United States, 475 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1977),
afl'd and district court opinion adopted, 604 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46 (D. Conn.
1971), aff'd, 455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972).
The district courts have applied Feres more readily to bar intentional
and constitutional torts. See Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.
Ohio 1980); Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980);
Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980); Nagy v. United States, 471
F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344
(D.D.C. 1979); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), a/l'd
mem. on other grounds, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
133. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will not decline review as it has
repeatedly done in past Third Circuit cases in the area of military tort recovery. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 461 (1979); Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d
774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
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